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RIDING THE WAVE: FAIRNESS FOR FOREIGN
INVESTORS IN INDIA!S IMPENDING
INSOLVENCY TSUNAMI
Nicole Mecca*
ABSTRACT
Reminiscent of the warning signs of a tsunami, bankruptcy and
insolvency courts across the globe have been eerily calm despite
unprecedented conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The full
extent of the pandemic’s effect, including a tidal wave of wide-spread
corporate and financial sector harm and wide-spread economic
distress, remains to be seen. Much like victims of natural disasters,
unsuspecting and increasingly delayed courts will find themselves
totally overwhelmed. The inconvenience felt by the courts is distinct,
however, from potential harm to financial investors. Although
investors could also be harmed by these judicial conditions, they
knowingly assumed certain financial risk when they invested. As
global economies continue to react to the aftermath of the pandemic,
a tsunami of bankruptcy and insolvency cases is also approaching.
This, too, sets the stage for potential mass harm if courts become
plagued by delay.
Across the globe, governments have issued controversial initial
responses to this impending tsunami of cases. For example, from
March 2020 to March 2021, the Indian government suspended new
corporate insolvency resolution proceedings under the country’s
recently reformed bankruptcy regime. It is worth noting that such
judicial delay can impose serious risks on insolvent entities and their
stakeholders. Asset, going concern, and recovery values may rapidly
and significantly decline while debtors and creditors await resolution,
undermining opportunities to emerge from the process with something
of worth intact. Of course, the situation is ripe to harm American
domestic companies and creditors and U.S. investors in foreign

* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2022. Thank you to Professors Susan Block-

Lieb and Janet Kearney for seemingly endless guidance on my research and writing, and
to the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for helping me turn a draft into
this scholarship. Finally, thank you also to my friends and family for your willingness to
listen, love, and support.

619

620

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

markets are at substantial risk. Specifically, U.S. investors in
companies subject to India’s suspension of new corporate insolvency
resolution proceedings find themselves particularly at risk. This
suspension of claims subjected investors to a year-long delay, in
which a judicially-blessed resolution was largely unavailable. Making
matters worse, their claims could be further delayed by the oncoming
swell of insolvency cases or prohibited altogether.
This Note focuses on what recourse foreign investors in Indian
companies may have against the controversial governmental measure
under bilateral investment treaties. Primarily, it explores how foreign
investors could challenge the relevant Ordinance by alleging the law
treated them unfairly or inequitably as compared to domestic investors
and creditors. A meritorious claim might demonstrate severely
diminished recovery value while pointing to unique limitations on
foreign investors’ ability to propose reorganization plans and out-ofcourt resolutions. However, notwithstanding the legitimacy of
investors’ claims and demonstrable impairment of recovery value, the
measure will likely be upheld as treating foreign and domestic
investors fairly and equitably, especially in light of the government’s
purposes for the suspension: to protect the economic health of the
country, shield enterprises of all sizes from unnecessary liquidation,
and preserve jobs provided by businesses of all varieties.
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INTRODUCTION
Before a tsunami, the shoreline recedes as an eerie calm settles the
shore. But when a wave rises forming a destructive wall, it brings mass
demolition. Reminiscent of the warning signs of a tsunami, U.S. and
global bankruptcy courts have been eerily calm; despite unprecedented
economic conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of
companies seeking an insolvency resolution was curiously low.1 But
tranquility in the courts is a temporary fa!ade: the full extent of the
pandemic’s effect, including severe financial distress in the economic and
corporate sectors, remains to be seen. Experts predict, like with a tsunami,
bankruptcy systems will face a wave of insolvency filings after this period
of repose"and quickly.2
If the systems facilitating insolvency resolutions, such as courts and
alternative dispute tribunals, fail to adequately prepare for the pending
wave of cases, they will become the flood’s victims, overwhelmed and
unable to maintain the efficiency needed to make multi-party insolvency
proceedings worthwhile. Judicial delays impose serious risks on insolvent
entities and their stakeholders. While debtors and creditors await a
1. In September 2020, bankruptcy filings were 28 percent lower than they were in
the same period in 2019. Jialan Wang et al., Bankruptc! and the COVID-19 Crisis 6, 11
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 21-041, 2020), https://www.hbs.edu/ris/
Publication%20Files/21-041_a9e75f26-6e50-4eb7-84d8-89da3614a6f9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PF2Y-5SCJ]. The lower number of filings can be explained by the low
cost of borrowing in the United States, stemming from historically low interest rates. See
Corinne Ball et al., Recent Trends in Corporate Debt and Reorgani"ations: La!ing the
Groundwork for Future Large Chapter 11 Cases or Just More Runwa!?, JONES DAY
WHITE PAPER 1, 7 (2022) https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2022/01/recent-trendsin-corporate-debt-and-reorganizations-laying-the-groundwork-for-future-large-chapter11-cases-or-just-more [https://perma.cc/K9AT-7742]. Filings have been further
suppressed by court closings in response to social distancing mandates. As social
distancing orders lifted, bankruptcy filings began to reach more predictable rates. See id.
at 11, 12.
2. See Adam J. Levitin, Op-ed: Reform Our Bankruptc! Laws Before a Tsunami of
Covid Debt Comes Due, CNBC (Jan. 11, 2021), www.cnbc.com/2021/01/11/op-edreform-bankruptcy-laws-before-covid-debt-comes-due.html [https://perma.cc/manage/
create?folder=4038-146836-155776-157672]. “This trend is particularly striking for
large businesses. Filings with greater than $50 million in assets have increased by nearly
200 percent year over year.” Wang et al., supra note 1, at 6. See also Colbert White, The
Bankruptc! Tsunami Ahead, FIS (Sept. 14, 2020), www.fisglobal.com/en/insights/whatwe-know/2020/september/the-bankruptcy-tsunami-ahead [https://perma.cc/W4BC-H2
UP].
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resolution, asset, going concern, and recovery values may rapidly and
significantly depreciate, undermining investors’ chance of emerging from
the process with something of worth intact.3 The calamity will reach
domestic stakeholders, foreign investors, adjudicating authorities, and all
parties impacted by the poor economic condition. However, unlike the
victims of a tsunami, investors consciously choose to assume financial
risk. As such, courts and tribunals may consider the impending harm to
investors, a result of crashing economic conditions globally, as a difficult
wave but one that investors must ride out and hope to survive.
This Note addresses the impending insolvency tsunami in India (the
“State”), focusing on what recourse foreign investors in Indian companies
may have against controversial governmental measures. It begins with the
notable changes made to the bankruptcy legal regime in India two years
after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Such measures include the
year-long suspension of new corporate insolvency resolution proceedings
(CIRP) from March 2020 to March 2021.4 The changes to the insolvency
resolution framework under this unprecedented measure (the “CIRP
Suspension” or the “Suspension”) may give rise to claims by foreign
investors challenging India’s CIRP Suspension under the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code of 2016 (the “2016 IBC,” or “IBC”).
The pandemic worsened the historically overburdened and
backlogged Indian courts’ ability to handle insolvency cases.5 A nearterm solution to pandemic-related complications in bankruptcy cases may
remain unlikely. There are, however, steps that foreign investors can take
to help ensure the pending insolvency cases are addressed in a timely
manner. One such measure includes challenging the Suspension. Foreign
investors may bring such a challenge by alleging the Suspension
arbitrarily delayed the necessary insolvency resolution, with the

3. See Saakshi Bangar, Legal Perspective on Insolvenc! and Bankruptc! Laws in
India, 45 VIKALPA 119, 119 (2020).
4. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, Bill No. XXXI
of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020). See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, # 10A (2016)
(“Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 7, 9, and 10, no application for
initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor shall be filed,
for any default arising on or after 25th March, 2020”).
5. BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG’S TRANSFORMATION INDEX, BTI 2022 COUNTRY
REPORT " INDIA 12 (2022).

624

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

detrimental cascading effect of diminishing their value on recovery, both
during and after the CIRP Suspension.6
Foreign investors seeking compensation for this type of harm may
find recourse under applicable bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which,
in recent years, have been interpreted in an investor-friendly manner
across the globe.7 Foreign investors may be even more likely to challenge
the State measure now in light of delays persisting beyond the CIRP
Suspension and the prohibition on their ability to propose a scheme of
arrangement. After analyzing the current conditions in India, legal
standards that allow foreign investors to challenge host-state actions, and
strength of such claims, this Note concludes that challenges to India’s
CIRP Suspension, which is strongly justified by public necessity, will
likely fail for two reasons: (1) the measure applies equally to domestic
and foreign investors; and (2) India’s court system has long been
overburdened.
Part I of this Note discusses the reforms made to India’s bankruptcy
framework in 2016, which improved legal and business conditions in the
State. It further predicts that, despite the previous improvements in
efficiency, India’s court system will be overburdened by the pending
insolvency tsunami created by the CIRP Suspension. Part I concludes by
discussing the rights of foreign investors in Indian companies, including
under applicable BITs. Part II describes the relevant legal standards
established by investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) jurisprudence,
focusing particularly on the fair and equitable treatment (FET) claims a
foreign investor may bring.8 While there are numerous ways for a foreign
investor to sufficiently allege the FET clause of an applicable BIT was
breached, Part II describes and analyzes three possible arguments
supporting such a claim: (A) denial of justice to investors facing extreme
judicial delay; (B) disturbance of the legal certainty provided under a
6. Prabhash Ranjan & Pushkar Anand, The 2016 Model Indian Bilateral Investment
Treat!: A Critical Deconstruction, 38 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 29-30 (2017) (discussing
international law’s manifest arbitrariness standard).
7. PRABHASH RANJAN, INDIA AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: REFUSAL,
ACCEPTANCE, BACKLASH 11-12 (2019).
8. Given the increasing frequency and broad interpretation of FET claims by ISDS
tribunals, this paper selectively reports on the feasibility of FET claims and does not
address the merits of claims under other common BITs clauses including most favored
nation, direct and indirect expropriation, and guarantees of effective means of asserting
rights. See NISHITH DESAI ASS’N, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INDIA 25 (2018).
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previous legal regime; and (C) disruption of a foreign investor’s
legitimate expectations at the time of their investment.9 Part III of this
Note analyzes the merits of such arguments while recognizing the strong
public policy underpinnings of the Suspension, and finds several
weaknesses inherent in a foreign investor’s potential arguments. The
conclusion discusses that a foreign investor is unlikely to prevail because
the harm it faces is not weighty enough to overcome strong arguments by
the State, namely that Indian courts have been historically overburdened,
the Suspension treats foreign and domestic investors equally, and the
measure was justified by a strong and emergent public purpose.
I. BACKGROUND
Bankruptcy professionals and legal scholars predict an inundation of
bankruptcy and insolvency filings as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic.10 Indeed, in September 2020, the United States saw “business
Chapter 11’s [] increase[] by 35 percent year-over-year . . . . [A]nd the
filings with greater than $50 million in assets [] increase[] by nearly 200
percent.”11 The U.S. bankruptcy courts may soon be overwhelmed by a
wave of new filings, which would lengthen the time it takes to resolve
each case and result in the corresponding destruction of estate value and,
therefore, recovery value.12
The oncoming bankruptcy tsunami is not restricted to the United
States:13 Within the first month of the pandemic’s onset, India saw an
uptick in bankruptcy filings that threatened to apply back-breaking

See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
William Lobel, A Wave of Bankruptcies and Foreclosures Appears to be
Building, KIPLINGER (Feb. 12, 2022), https://www.kiplinger.com/personal-finance/
credit-debt/debt/bankruptcy/604198/a-wave-of-bankruptcies-and-foreclosures-appears
[https://perma.cc/FR8G-SDH7].
11. See Wang et al., supra note 1, at 3.
12. See Dina Gerdeman, Coronavirus Could Create a #Bankruptc! Pandemic$,
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (May 28, 2020), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/coronavirus-couldcreate-a-bankruptcy-pandemic [https://perma.cc/ZH63-B2CY].
13. See Homi Kharas, What To Do About the Coming Debt Crisis in Developing
Countries, BROOKINGS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2020/04/13/what-to-do-about-the-coming-debt-crisis-in-developingcountries/ [https://perma.cc/ULL2-RXKQ]; Russell Lynch, Europe Faces Bankruptc!
#Tsunami$, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/other/
europe-faces-bankruptcy-tsunami/ar-BB1g9Cjc?li=AAwnS0s [https://perma.cc/29V36MH4].
9.
10.
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pressure to its already-stressed judicial infrastructure.14 This caused
delays two-fold: while CIRP were slow at the initiation, delays continued
to plague cases into litigation.15 With courts operating remotely and at
decreased capacity, resolving these delays would not be easy. So, the
State suspended new CIRP filings to prevent additional backlog from
damaging the developing legal framework.16 However, the judicial
system in India has historically been fraught with inefficiency, posing
serious and systematic barriers to timely legal resolutions; this is
especially true for already unwieldy insolvency proceedings.17
In recent years, India has undertaken significant efforts to improve
its business and legal conditions, including the major development of the
2016 IBC.18 Many of these endeavors have been successful, but some
legal frameworks including one for cross-border insolvency, have yet to
be adopted.19
A. INDIA’S PRE- AND POST-PANDEMIC BANKRUPTCY FRAMEWORK
1. 2016 and Earlier
In 2016, India enacted the IBC to overhaul the post-colonial regime:
a patchwork of “three major laws, two ancillary laws, and one special
provision.”20 This reform was intended to improve foreign investment and
economic development in India, with the stated goal of “break[ing] into
the top fifty of the World Bank rankings.”21

14. MINISTRY CORP. AFFS. GOV’T INDIA, REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW
COMMITTEE 21 (2020).
15. Id.
16. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, # 10A (suspending India’s
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Sections 7, 9, and 10), promulgated by The Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No. XXXI of 2020, # 10A
(June 5, 2020), which enacted the CIRP Suspension, effective March 25, 2020.
17. REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE supra note 14, at 24.
18. Jason D. Woodard, Racing to Resolution: A Preliminar! Stud! of India$s New
Bankruptc! Code, 52 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 393, 396, 421, 424 (2020).
19. Gabriela Roca-Fernandez, Comment, Cross-Border Insolvenc! in India: A
Resistance to Change, 29 TULANE J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 99, 111-15 (2021).
20. BANKR. L. REFORMS COMM., THE REPORT OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS
COMMITTEE VOLUME I: RATIONALE AND DESIGN 24 (2015). The State similarly
overhauled the Companies Act in 2013. Id. at 7.
21. Woodard, supra note 18, at 393, 396, 421, 424.
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Before the 2016 IBC was passed, insolvency proceedings were
governed piecemeal by several laws.22 The fragmented regime was
complicated, inconsistent, disjointed, and at times required up to 11 years
before an insolvency case reached a resolution.23 Before the 2016 reform,
the regime was plagued by “poor enforcement mechanism[s], slow court
process[es] and staggered business rescue measures.”24
The IBC was developed to “maximi[ze] value of assets of [insolvent
entities], to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance
the interests of all the stakeholders.”25 It became, “the comprehensive
insolvency code in India, and it expressly supersed[ed] all inconsistent
prior laws.”26 The following figure demonstrates the transformative
impact of the 2016 IBC reform on recovery of insolvent banks.

22. Before 2016, the laws governing insolvency proceedings in India included: the
Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act of 1993, the Sick Industrial
Companies Act of 1985, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act of 2002, the Companies Act of 1956, and other
special provisions. All acts were effective simultaneously, including the oldest applicable
act, issued 60 years before the IBC took effect. See BANKR. L. REFORMS COMM., supra
note 20, at 25.
23. See Farok J. Contractor et al., How Do Countr! Regulations and Business
Environment Impact Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows?, 29 INT’L BUS. REV. 1, 5
(2020) (analyzing data collected from 2004).
24. NEETI SHIKHA & URVASHI SHAHI, IBBI RESEARCH INITIATIVE: ASSESSMENT OF
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY AND RESOLUTION TIMELINE 1 (2021). The Indian insolvency
regime “prior to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC/Code) was multilayered with multiple fora for adjudication which resulted in undue delay in resolution,
conflicting judgments and erosion of investor’s confidence.” Id.
25. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020), Statement of Objects and Reasons, $ 1.
26. Woodard, supra note 18, at 426.
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2. The 2016 Insolvenc! and Bankruptc! Code
Designed to promote systematic efficiency and invite foreign
investment into India, the IBC provided a new, sophisticated yet workable
framework for resolving insolvency.28 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India (the “IBBI”)29 indicated that the 2016 IBC was enacted “to
provide a facilitative mechanism for resolution of stressed assets in a time
bound manner,”30 uniquely pulling from regimes that favor both debtors27. MINISTRY FIN. GOV’T INDIA, Chapter 4: Monetar! Management and Financial
Intermediation, in ECON. SURV. 2020-21 VOLUME II: MONETARY MANAGEMENT AND
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 153 (2021) [hereinafter ECON. SURV. 2020-21 VOLUME II].
28. REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE supra note 14, at 5. See generall!
Insolvency & Bankr. Bd. India, The Quarterl! Newsletter of the Insolvenc! and
Bankruptc! Board of India, INSOLVENCY & BANKR. NEWS, July-Sept. 2020 [hereinafter
July-Sept. 2020 IBBI Quarterly]; Jason Jack, A Missing Variable: The Impact of CrossBorder Insolvenc! Laws on Foreign Direct Investment, 27 MINN. J. INT’L L. 313, 313
(2018) (“[S]tates with more developed legal rights for creditors generally tend to have
higher levels of FDI.”).
29. The IBBI is a regulatory and supervisory body created by the IBC, responsible
for implementing and operationalizing the IBC. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016, # 196 (creating the IBBI). See NISHITH DESAI ASSOCS., A PRIMER ON THE
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016 1 (2019).
30. See SHIKHA & SHAHI, supra note 24, at 1.
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in-possession and creditors-in-control.31 These amendments made the
new law “proactive, incentive compliant, market led, and time-bound.”32
Of course, professionals understood that realization of these goals would
take time.33 After the IBC was adopted in 2016, “infrastructure [still
needed] to be created; capacity to be built; professions to be developed;
the markets and practices to emerge.”34
Under the updated regime, India made “meteoric” progress toward
its stated goal to break into the top 50 of the World Bank rankings.35
Jumping 57 spots “[s]ince the adoption of the IBC, India has risen in the
Doing Business36 index more than any other country.”37 While measuring
the IBC’s beneficial effects has not been a straightforward process,
31. See Insolvency & Bankr. Bd. India, The Quarterl! Newsletter of the Insolvenc!
and Bankruptc! Board of India, Insolvency & Bankr. News, Oct.-Dec. 2020 2
[hereinafter Oct.-Dec. 2020 IBBI Quarterly].
32. MINISTRY CORP. AFFS. GOV’T INDIA, REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE
INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE ON PRE-PACKAGED INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS 1
(2021) [hereinafter REPORT ON PRE-PACKAGED INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION].
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See Woodard, supra note 18, at 421-22.
36. The Doing Business Index, including reports and data, are compiled and issued
by the World Bank, and “rank[] the ease of opening and operating companies in 190
countries.” See DOING BUSINESS, About 19 (2016); Fernanda G. Nicola, Scandal
Involving World Bank$s #Doing Business$ Inde% E%poses Problems in Using Sportslike
Rankings to Guide Development Goals, CONVERSATION (Oct. 15, 2021), www.the
conversation.com/scandal-involving-world-banks-doing-business-index-exposesproblems-in-using-sportslike-rankings-to-guide-development-goals-169691
[https://
perma.cc/4QRV-2EGM]. While many methods of evaluating the growth of an economy
exist, and the 2018 and 2020 Doing Business reports have been criticized for irregularity
and lack of transparency, the World Bank is working to publicly disclose any problematic
discrepancies in past data to restore the report’s credibility. RONALD C. MACHEN ET AL.,
INVESTIGATION OF DATA IRREGULARITIES IN DOING BUSINESS 2018 AND DOING BUSINESS
2020 (2021), thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/84a922cc9273b7b120d 49ad3b9e9d3f90090012021/original/DB-Investigation-Findings-and-Report-to-the-Board-ofExecutive-Directors-September-15-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ4Y-UG RB]; Andrea
Shalal, World Bank Aims To Replace Canceled #Doing Business$ Report in Two Years,
REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/world-bank-aims-replacecanceled-doing-business-report-two-years-2021-11-10/ [https://perma.cc/ 52BD-4T9S].
37. See Woodard, supra note 18, at 421-22 (“India’s 2019 overall score was 67.23,
which translated to a ranking of 77th. When Prime Minister Modi set the top-50 goal,
India’s overall rank was 134th. This 57-spot jump over the last six years is the highest of
any of the 190 countries measured.”). Evidence shows the World Bank Doing Business
Reports are not a full measure of India’s economic and business sector development as
multiple statistical categories remain unreported.
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commercial lending has increased every year since it was enacted,
alongside other measures of an efficient capital market.38 Remarkably,
under the IBC, the time required to resolve corporate reorganization
proceedings decreased from up to 11 years, before the IBC took effect, to
364 days in the fourth quarter of 2019.39
3. During and Post-Pandemic
While the 2016 IBC improved the efficiency of insolvency
proceedings, protective responses to the pandemic changed the economic
and legal landscape.40 In March 2020, courts across the world closed their
doors to abide by social distancing requirements, exacerbating existing
judicial backlogs.41 India, too, suffered COVID-19’s consequences: The
historically overburdened courts, already saturated with a high volume of
insolvency cases, faced increasing pressure and worsening delays during
both the initiation and litigation stages of CIRP.42
Shortly after COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic,43 the State
issued an Ordinance, effective March 25, 2020, suspending new CIRP.
The CIRP Suspension stated that “no application shall ever be filed for
initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor
for the said default occurring during the said period.”44 In addition to this
38. See id. (analyzing all available data to discern the true impact of the IBC on the
business environment in India given categorical gaps in the statistics used by the Doing
Business index, such as unreported recovery rates for debtors facing liquidation).
39. See Contractor et al., supra note 23. See also Insolvency & Bankr. Bd. India, The
Quarterl! Newsletter of the Insolvenc! and Bankruptc! Board of India, Insolvency &
Bankr. News, Oct.-Dec. 2019, 18 [hereinafter Oct.-Dec. 2019 IBBI Quarterly].
40. See Woodard, supra note 18, at 396.
41. See generall! Standing Int’l F. Com. Cts., Delivering justice during the Covid19 pandemic and the future use of technolog!, Anne% A (2020), sifocc.org/app/
uploads/2020/05/SIFoCC-Covid-19-Annex-A-29-May-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN
9L-RXPF].
42. See, e.g., Contractor et al., supra note 23, at 5. See also REPORT OF THE
INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE supra note 14; Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed
Insolvencies, IBC L. (Mar. 21, 2021), www.ibclaw.in/post-suspension-analysis-ofstressed-insolvencies-mr-miheer-jain [https://perma.cc/P6MC-T3DX].
43. WHO Director-General$s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID19 - 11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/
director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-mediabriefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/UY9K-UF9P].
44. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, Bill No. XXXI
of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020). See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, # 10A (2016)
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wholesale prohibition of insolvency resolution for defaults occurring
during the first year of the pandemic, the Suspension further prohibited
debtors and creditors from initiating CIRP under Sections 7, 9, and 10 of
the IBC via the new IBC Section 10A, which was effective until March
25, 2021.45 Finally, the Suspension amended IBC Section 66 to state that
“no application shall be filed by a resolution professional” against a
corporate debtor for fraudulent or wrongful trading during the CIRP
Suspension.46

(“Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 7, 9, and 10, no application for
initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor shall be filed,
for any default arising on or after 25th March, 2020”). See also Wanda Borges, Insolvenc!
and Restructuring Changes Around the World During COVID-19, 2020 COMM. L.
WORLD 10 (2021). The Suspension aimed to protect companies from forced insolvency
proceedings resulting from the poor economic conditions in the wake of the pandemic.
While some scholars have expressed skepticism about whether this change would
perpetually disallow these insolvency claims, the IBBI confirmed the Ordinance prohibits
defaults during the Suspension from ever becoming the basis for CIRPs. Compare Karry
Lai, India$s Suspension of Insolvenc! Proceedings Brings Risks, 2020 INT’L FIN. L. REV.
1 (2020), with Insolvency & Bankr. Bd. India & Int’l Fin. Corp., Introduction, in
UNDERSTANDING THE IBC KEY JURISPRUDENCE AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: A
HANDBOOK, 60 (2020) [hereinafter IBBI & IFC].
45. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, # 10A (2016). See also The
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, # 7 (2016) (governing the application to initiate
corporate insolvency resolution process by a financial creditor); The Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, # 9 (2016) (governing initiation of corporate insolvency resolution
process by an operational creditor); The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, # 10 (2016)
(governing the initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by corporate
applicant (corporate debtor)). Extended in September and December of 2020, the CIRP
Suspension finally ended on March 25, 2021. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No. XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020)
(beginning the CIRP Suspension on March 25, 2020); The Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2020, Bill No. XVII of 2020, # 10A (Sept. 23, 2020)
(extending the Suspension from 3 months to 6 months after enactment); The Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2020, Bill No. XXXIII of 2020, # 10A
(Dec. 25, 2020) (extending the Suspension 9 months after its issuance, for an additional
3 months).
46. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill
No. XXXI of 2020, # 66(3) (June 5, 2020). While this Note does not discuss the
potentially damaging implications of this provision, it has been purported that the change
“may lead to a rise in fraudulent activities, as it provides unwarranted protection to the
directors and partners of a corporate debtor from being held liable even for any fraudulent
transactions committed during the pandemic period " even in the future.” Lai, supra note
44 at 2.
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While the Suspension was intended to protect India’s courts from
further overburden, deferring new CIRP has a severe and negative effect
on insolvent companies’ chances of survival. The Suspension merely
suspended new proceedings without dealing with the underlying culprit
of a company’s financial distress: the company’s debt obligations.47
Indeed, the underlying debt and onerous financial obligations remained
active and in effect, and likely continued to accrue interest.48 The
Suspension only paused the remed! for resolving these unsustainable
debts"not the harm itself.
While the Suspension may have been temporary, its effects will be
long-lasting as many corporate debtors’ financial distress worsened while
new CIRP were unavailable. This is because a company’s insolvency (an
economic condition) would likely worsen during the postponement of
their CIRP (a legal remedy for that condition).49 Despite high demand for
reorganization and liquidation under the IBC,50 the Suspension removed
this option (permanently to some).51 For companies and claims that
survived the Suspension, potentially facing heightened financial distress,
the year-long delay also gave rise to worsening conditions in the legal
system.52
Although two other countries53 issued payment collection
moratoriums during the pandemic, no country but India took the extreme
47. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020) (failing to address how corporate debtors and
creditors are to address underlying, potentially distressed debt obligations).
48. Id.
49. See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG’S TRANSFORMATION INDEX, supra note 5.
50. REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE supra note 14.
51. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, Bill No. XXXI
of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020). In effect, the Suspension prevents companies that
defaulted under IBC Section 4 between March 25, 2020, and March 25, 2021 from ever
filing insolvency claims based on defaults that occurred during the year-long Suspension.
See Trilegal, Covid-19: Insolvenc! and Bankruptc! Code Amended to Suspend Initiation
of Insolvenc! Proceedings for Si% Months, LEXOLOGY (June 25, 2020), www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=87e4f867-455a-4dc4-8df4-9eab4d390f0b [https://
perma.cc/8F4R-LD4Y].
52. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42.
53. Two other countries issued suspensions to their insolvency legal regimes:
Germany and Russia. The German Parliament temporarily amended the Insolvency Act,
suspending the mandate to file an insolvency proceeding which results from the
coronavirus pandemic. See Borges, supra note 44, at 11. Unlike the situation in India, the
suspension does not apply where the insolvency administrator can prove the insolvency
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step of suspending new claims for all events of default that occurred
during a specified period, blocking new insolvency cases.54 The effects of
this measure are drastic: Companies that became insolvent between
March 2020 and March 2021 will never be eligible to file a CIRP based
on any event of default during that purported year.55 Creditors with claims
against companies rendered insolvent during that year will be
permanently left without recourse in the Indian court system.56
Further, an insolvent company’s asset value risked significant and
rapid decline during this period, diminishing as quickly as “ice melts.” 57
Concurrently, the creditors themselves may have suffered from financial
distress and economic harm due to the diminishment of such asset value.58
And yet, neither the company nor its creditors could find protection under
the IBC because of the Suspension. Delayed insolvency resolutions
hinder a debtor’s ability to maximize company value; this in turn holds
further deleterious economic implications for the debtor’s creditors. 59
did not result from the pandemic. See id. The Russian Federation Government issued a
moratorium on new insolvency proceedings by creditors only in only specific situations.
See id. at 12.
54. See Borges, supra note 44, at 11-12.
55. See id. at 11. Insolvency resolution proceedings under the IBC begin when
India’s National Company Law Tribunal grants a debtor or creditor’s application for such
proceedings, which can be filed only after an event of a threshold amount of default
occurs. See INSOLVENCY & BANKR. BD. INDIA, INSOLVENCY PROFESSIONAL: A KEY TO
RESOLUTION INFORMATION BROCHURE (2021); C. Scott Pryor & Risham Garg,
Differential Treatment Among Creditors Under India$s Insolvenc! and Bankruptc! Code,
2016: Issues and Solutions, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123, 125 (2020). The Ordinance also
lifted the threshold amount constituting a default to further prevent unnecessary
insolvency and liquidations especially best protect Micro, Small, and Medium
Enterprises. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020,
Bill No. XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020); REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW
COMMITTEE, supra note 14.
56. Trilegal, supra note 51.
57. See generall! Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating
the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptc!, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014); Lynn M.
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptc! Fire Sales, l06 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2007)
(reporting that 16 of the 30 cases in their sample of large public company bankruptcies
made “melting ice cube arguments”). See also In re Shoot the Moon, LLC, 635 B.R. 568,
570 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2022) (dicta) (“This need for speed derives from some debtors
being the proverbial %melting ice cube’ . . . . [D]elay rarely increases stakeholder
recoveries.”).
58. See Bangar, supra note 3 at 119.
59. See REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE, supra note 14 (“This large
number of applications is adding pressure on judicial infrastructure, which is causing
delays both at the stage of admission and during litigation in the CIRP. These delays
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While judicial delay is never helpful, it is particularly harmful to parties
in bankruptcy.
Since March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted almost
every industry in India, with the Nifty-Fifty Index falling below 8,100 for
the first time since 2017.60 Despite the implementation of the 2016 IBC
and other pre-pandemic business law reforms, the few businesses that
have not yet experienced financial distress are at risk of faltering.61
Companies making ends meet now by borrowing under low interest rates
will be at risk when market conditions catch up;62 an alarming number of
defaults and insolvencies could occur.63
Though the aim of the Suspension was to prevent backlog and delay
while courts operated at historically low capacity, CIRP delays actually
worsened during the Suspension. In the fourth quarter of 2020, Indian
corporate insolvency proceedings took, on average, 456 days"nearly 170
percent longer than the statutory mandate which requires proceedings to
be resolved within 270 days of commencement.64 During the same period,
on average, 86 percent of CIRP lasted over 270 days.65 Comparatively,
during the same period in 2019, only 32 percent of CIRP required more
than 270 days to reach a resolution.66
Compounded with the existing backlog, the high volume of current
cases will continue to saturate the judicial infrastructure, hampering the
efficacy of the insolvency resolution framework; this will only be made

cause uncertainty for investors and have the potential to hinder a value maximizing
insolvency resolution.”).
60. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42. The NiftyFifty Index is India’s National Stock Exchange. Praveen Kumar & Ankit Kumar,
Corporate Social Responsibilit! Disclosure and Financial Performance: Further
Evidence from NIFTY 50 Firms, 11 INT’L J. BUS. INSIGHTS & TRANSFORMATION 62, 64
(2018).
61. See generall! R. Ramakumar & Tejal Kanitkar, Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic
on the Indian Econom!, 80 INVESTIGACI&N ECON&MICA 3 (2020).
62. See Ball et al., supra note 1 at 1, 6.
63. See id.; Wang et al., supra note 1, at 6.
64. See Oct.-Dec. 2020 IBBI Quarterly, supra note 31, at 17.
65. See id. at 17. “Section 12 of the Code provides for a specific timeline of 180 days
for completion of a CIRP from the date of admission of application which can be
extended further by maximum 90 days on filing of an application” providing the relevant
270 day “statutory period.” See Shikha & Shahi, supra note 24, at 1.
66. See Oct.-Dec. 2019 IBBI Quarterly, supra note 39, at 15.
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worse when the tsunami of new insolvency proceedings crashes.67 The
rising number of financially troubled and insolvent companies could
flood the courts with a wave of newly initiated CIRP.68 The Indian courts,
specifically the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), may become more
seriously overburdened by these new filings, worsening the delayed
conditions and creating a backlog that could last for years.69 The
longstanding nature of the pandemic has been well established.70 As the
pandemic continues to impact global operations, severe judicial
inefficiency is likely to continue impairing the rights of investors, lenders,
and all parties seeking insolvency resolution. This creates uncertainty in
the resolution process and forces company value to depreciate until a
resolution can be reached.71 Likewise, public trust in the bankruptcy and
insolvency system risks rapid, irreparable damage.72
In light of the inefficiencies plaguing the courts and claimants across
India, including in the NCLT, advocates and governmental committees
are calling for amendments to the IBC and related business laws.73 The

67. “[T]he suspension of sections 7, 9 or 10 of the IBC would only give a temporar!
relief to [corporate debtors] and postpone the stress but may fail to address their stress
per se.” INSOLVENCY & BANKR. BD. INDIA, INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN
INDIA: A NARRATIVE xvi (2020) (emphasis added).
68. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42.
69. The NCLT, established under Section 408 of India’s Companies Act of 2013,
has jurisdiction over India’s insolvency proceedings, which are reviewed by the appellate
court, the NCLAT. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, # 60(5)(c) (2016).
70. Krista Conger, Two Years Into the Pandemic, Medical Scientists Consider What
the Future Ma! Hold, STANFORD MED. (Mar. 11, 2022), https://med.stanford.
edu/news/all-news/2022/03/scientists-pandemic-future.html [https://perma.cc/VC9HMENM].
71. See REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 21 (“This
large number of applications is adding pressure on judicial infrastructure, which is
causing delays both at the stage of admission and during litigation in the CIRP. These
delays cause uncertainty for investors and have the potential to hinder a value maximizing
insolvency resolution.”).
72. See BANKR. L. REFORMS COMM., supra note 20, at 64.
73. See Misha et al., E%pectations from IBC 2.0 and the Impact of New COVID-19
Wave, L. ST. INDIA (Apr. 30, 2021), www.lawstreetindia.com/experts/column?sid=556
[https://perma.cc/CN6N-RLSD] (advocating for further IBC reforms responsive to the
current second wave of COVID infections); Anirudh Burman, India$s Sustained
Economic Recover! Will Require Changes to Its Bankruptc! L. 1, 6 (Carnegie India,
Working Paper, 2021), https://carnegieindia.org/2021/04/05/india-s-sustained-economic
-recovery-will-require-changes-to-its-bankruptcy-law-pub-84234 [https://perma.cc/M9
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push for reform is focused on the need to improve the IBC’s functioning
to ensure a sustained economic recovery in India.74 The Ministry of
Corporate Affairs also encouraged changes to the legal framework to
allow pre-packaged insolvency solutions, which are developed out of
court and only later blessed by a judge in a confirmation e% post facto.75
Despite legislative advocacy campaigns for reform, at this point,
distressed companies that currently need an insolvency resolution will not
reap the benefits of future changes. This is further evidence of how delay
is particularly damaging for insolvency claimants.76 Delayed bankruptcy
proceedings often result in measurable, tangible, and avoidable harm due
to the depreciating asset value that comes with insolvency.77
XR-8MPU]. See also, REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at
5-7; REPORT ON PRE-PACKAGED INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION, supra note 32.
74. See Burman, supra note 73.
75. See REPORT ON PRE-PACKAGED INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION, supra note 32. Prepackaged insolvency resolutions are already allowed for corporate micro-, small-, and
medium-enterprises, but permissions for larger businesses to utilize the tool could also
be allowed. Insolvency & Bankr. Bd. India, The Quarterl! Newsletter of the Insolvenc!
and Bankruptc! Board of India, INSOLVENCY & BANKR. NEWS, Apr.-June 2021, at 6.
76. According to IBC Section 60(5)(c), the NCLT has jurisdiction over Indian
corporate insolvencies. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, # 60(5)(c).
Appeals from NCLT decisions are reviewed by the appellate court, (NCLAT).
77. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India describes this problem as
follows:
Speed is of essence for the working of the bankruptcy code, for two
reasons. First, while the “calm period” can help keep an organisation
afloat, without the full clarity of ownership and control, significant
decisions cannot be made. Without effective leadership, the firm will
tend to atrophy and fail. The longer the delay, the more likely it is that
liquidation will be the only answer. Second, the liquidation value
tends to go down with time as many assets suffer from a high
economic rate of depreciation. From the viewpoint of creditors, a good
realisation can generally be obtained if the firm is sold as a going
concern. Hence, when dela!s induce liquidation, there is value
destruction. Further, even in liquidation, the realisation is lower when
there are delays. Hence, dela!s cause value destruction. Thus,
achieving a high recovery rate is primarily about identifying and
combating the sources of delay.
Letter from I. Sreekara Rao, Chief General Manager, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board
of India, Re: Compliance with the provisions of Section 12 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, Nov. 11, 2019, $ 2 (Nov. 11, 2019) (emphasis added).
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Despite the Suspension, borrowers’ chances for rehabilitation and
creditors’ opportunity for distributions will almost certainly decrease. 78
Because the assets of an insolvent company continue to depreciate before
and during insolvency proceedings, the Suspension will become a twofold source of judicial delay. First, as the parties await filing during the
Suspension, going concern and asset value are presumably lost, perhaps
precipitously.79 Where going concern value diminishes, some salvageable
businesses may be forced to liquidate, depriving them of the secondchance that so frequently motivates insolvency proceedings.80 Second,
asset value and the remnants of a firm’s going concern value will continue
to decline during the adjudication of claims,81 a process that will require
substantially more time during the tsunami of cases. Like a whirlpool, the
negative effects of the existing judicial conditions compound one another,
working together to push firms further and further under water.82
4. Foreign Parties$ Rights Under India$s Legal Regime Governing
Insolvenc!
Given the level of international investment in India, foreign investors
likely make up a notable portion of creditors aggrieved by the Suspension.
The recovery value of a foreign investor’s claims, like claims by domestic
lenders, will diminish over time.83 Because of this, a foreign investor may
attempt to file a FET claim challenging the Ordinance and seeking
compensation for lost CIRP recovery value during the Suspension. But
because the measure treats foreign and domestic parties indistinguishably,
the measure will be considered fair and equitable toward foreign
investors.84 Yet, despite this facially equal treatment, foreign investors
face unique challenges to insolvency recovery in India because there is
78. See Pratyush Hari, IBC Suspension: Too Much to Chew on for the Banks?,
ACADEMIKE (Aug. 5, 2020), www.lawctopus.com/academike/ibc-suspension-too-muchto-chew-on-for-the-banks [https://perma.cc/GL5V-Q765]. See also Shikha & Shahi,
supra note 24, at 5.
79. See Bangar, supra note 3.
80. WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND
CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS 19 (2001).
81. Id. at 30.
82. IBBI & IFC, supra note 44, at 4 (“[W]eak insolvency regimes, can push viable
enterprises into non-viability through lengthy and overly complex restructuring
procedures or lead to the proliferation of zombie firms that leach productive resources
from the market.”).
83. See WORLD BANK, supra note 80, at 30.
84. Id.

638

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

no internationally agreed upon framework governing cross-border
procedural issues.85
Historically, India’s cross-border insolvency practice has been
nearly unworkable.86 The bankruptcy of Jet Airways provides an example
of the multi-tiered problems implicated by a cross-border insolvency case
involving India’s courts. In that matter, an Indian airline with assets and
creditors both at home and in the Netherlands was pushed into CIRP in
Indian courts while competing insolvency proceedings were also filed in
the Netherlands.87 Without a law enabling India’s courts to recognize the
foreign proceedings or any agreement regarding cross-border
enforcement mechanisms, creditors raced to seize the company’s assets. 88
This case exemplifies the challenges and complexities of attempting to
reach an international insolvency resolution without a mutually agreeable
framework governing, at least, procedural issues.89 The difficulty of
coming to a cross-border resolution"especially one that allows corporate
debtors to continue operating to preserve their going concern"should be
addressed with urgency in India and across the globe.90
In light of such difficulties with reaching cross-border insolvency
solutions, scholars and governmental groups have called for the adoption
of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model Law”) as a chapter in the
IBC.91 Until the Model Law is adopted and embraced, however,
85. Economic Surve! Underlines Need for Standardised Framework for Cross
Border Insolvenc!, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2022), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/economy/policy/economic-survey-underlines-need-for-standardised-frameworkfor-cross-border-insolvency/articleshow/89247662.cms
[https://perma.cc/4K7G-YD
AL].
86. See Priya Misra & Adam Feibelman, The Institutional Challenges of a CrossBorder Insolvenc! Regime, 2 CORP. & BUS. L.J. 329, 330 (2021).
87. Id.
88. Id. (“The Mumbai Tribunal refused to recognize the Dutch proceeding or allow
the Dutch administrator to participate in the insolvency proceeding in India because it
found that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code did not formally allow for either
action.”).
89. Gabriela Roca-Fernandez, Comment, Cross-Border Insolvenc! in India: A
Resistance to Change, 29 TULANE J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 99, 112 (2021).
90. See Misra & Feibelman, supra note 86, at 331-33.
91. See Roca-Fernandez, supra note 19; INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN
INDIA: A NARRATIVE, supra note 67, at 16-17 (“The ILC has proposed to add a Chapter
to the Code to introduce a globally accepted and well recognized cross border insolvency
framework, the [UNCITRAL] Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, considering the
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difficulties with resolving cross-border insolvencies under the IBC are to
be expected.92 While the current conditions in India may slow the
legislative process, scholars in India and across borders have advocated
for the adoption of the Model Law, pressuring the government to make
this change.93
While foreign investors may challenge India’s CIRP Suspension by
alleging the law does not treat them fairly or equitably,94 their claims
against the measure suffer from inherent weakness because the
Suspension applies identically to both domestic and foreign investors.95
However, because the strength of a FET claim depends on the severity of
the damage caused by the challenged measure, a contest of the year-long
Suspension showing severe impairment of a foreign investor’s CIRP
recovery is not without merit.96 Further, as a foreign investor’s potential
recovery under the IBC declines, its potential compensation for such
harm, recoverable by bringing a successful FET claim, climbs. Under
such a FET claim, the burden on the investor to establish harm caused by
a challenged governmental measure will be balanced against the necessity
of the governmental intervention.97 If an international tribunal found that
fact that some corporates transact businesses in more than one jurisdiction and have assets
across many jurisdictions.”).
92. See Misra & Feibelman, supra note 86, at 352.
93. See, e.g., Sneha Singh, Dualit! of Regime to Handle Insolvenc! of Foreign
Companies in India, 10 INDIAN J.L. & JUST. 155, 156 (2019); Roca-Fernandez, supra
note 19, at 112-13; INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE,
supra note 67; IBBI & IFC, supra note 44, at 20.
94. Legal commentators have hypothesized that foreign investors will challenges the
Suspension under BITs. See, e.g., Pawan Jhabak et al., Is All Well on the BIT and
Arbitration Front After India$s Insolvenc! Code Amendments?, WIRE (July 12, 2020),
www.thewire.in/business/bit-arbitration-front-india-amendments-insolvency-code
[https://perma.cc/FH2U-66E3]. See also Poornima Advani, Insolvenc! Code
Amendments and Bits: A Possible Recourse for Foreign Creditors, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
www.ibanet.org/article/b4399826-fc9e-4dd3-9390-6785ae81d30c [https://perma.cc/98
SE-JYBB] (last visited June 19, 2022); Aayush Akar, Suspension of IBC Proceeding and
Bilateral Investments: How It Affects India?, LEGAL SERV. INDIA E-J. (Mar. 15, 2021),
www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5139-suspension-of-ibc-proceeding-andbilateral-investments-how-it-affects-india-.html [https://perma.cc/E56U -KKZE].
95. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020) (imposing the CIRP Suspension beginning March
25, 2020).
96. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award 4,
42 (2011).
97. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
1788 (Dec. 21, 2020), www.investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/
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the investor’s impaired rights constituted a violation of international law,
the State could be required to compensate the foreign investor.98
Notwithstanding the facially equal application of the Suspension,
foreign investors face another unique challenge to insolvency recovery in
India. The value of a foreign investor’s impairment differs from that of a
domestic creditor in one important respect: certain foreign entities are
disabled from proposing a resolution plan under either CIRP or through a
scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act.99 While foreign and
domestic investors may both initiate an application for CIRP, and were
both prevented from doing so during the Suspension, the IBC
distinguishes between the rights of foreign and domestic parties once such
a proceeding has been commenced in the following way: “[f]oreign
banks, foreign institutional investors, foreign portfolio investors and
foreign venture capital investors” are disqualified from presenting a
resolution plan for a corporate debtor facing CIRP.100 Domestic counterparts, however, are largely free to propose such a plan which, presumably,
favors their claims and interests.101

cases/691/cairn-v-india [https://perma.cc/CR7Y-Y7WF] (requiring a governmental
measure “not be more burdensome for the individual’s rights and interests than required
by the [State’s] pursued public purpose” when analyzing whether a promise of fair and
equitable treatment to foreign investors was breached).
98. See RANJAN, supra note 7, at 8; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations:
Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 101 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.)
3, 5 (2007).
99. Also strengthening these claims is the ILC’s early finding that a governmentally
imposed moratorium on insolvency proceedings should not exceed 60 days from the date
of the order and should not be extended. See REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW
COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 29. The moratorium was initially ordered to persist for 180
days and was in fact extended twice to disallow claims for an entire year. See also The
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, supra note 46.
100. See INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE, supra note
67, at 102. See also The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, # 29A. The proportion
of foreign investors within these categories is not negligible: 33 percent of all foreign
direct investment (FDI) into India from April 2000 to December 2020 was from foreign
institutional investors alone, which comprises only one of the four categories enumerated
in Section 29A. See DEP’T FOR PROMOTION INDUS. & INTERNAL TRADE GOV’T INDIA,
Quarterl! Fact Sheet: Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) From April, 2000
to December, 2020 (2021), www.dipp.gov.in/publications/fdi-statistics [https://perma.
cc/LR7J-7LLY].
101. Scholars have recognized, “section 29A . . . will likely serve as a big deterrent to
foreign investors . . . . Nowhere in the world does such a restriction in the nature of section
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Although access to CIRP by distressed Indian companies was
restricted from 2020 to 2021, Indian law allows an alternative method of
resolution: Section 230 of the Companies Act enables stakeholders to
come to an out-of-court resolution of the company’s insolvency through
a scheme of arrangement, which is subsequently acknowledged (or
“blessed”) by the NCLT.102 However, India’s Supreme Court recently
held that the restrictions on which parties can propose a resolution plan
under IBC Section 29A also applies to Section 230 schemes of
arrangement.103 A scheme may no longer be proposed by foreign banks,
institutional investors, portfolio investors, and venture capitalists. 104
Conflating the limitations imposed by the complicated cross-border
insolvency conundrum, this ruling may further restrict foreign entities’
rights.105
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court did not issue
its ruling restricting foreign entities from proposing a scheme until March
15, 2021.106 Therefore, the restriction did not apply to limit the foreigners’
proposal abilities for the duration of the Suspension, which ended on
March 25, 2021.107 Indeed, except during a 10 day period, all foreign
investors could propose a scheme of arrangement throughout the

29A exist. They will find it hard to swallow this bitter pill.” See INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE, supra note 67, at 234.
102. The Companies Act, 2013, # 230. See INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME
IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE, supra note 67, at 248. These schemes allow debtors and creditors
to independently negotiate and restructure a company, and they are especially helpful
where court facilitation is not needed for parties to reach an agreement about continuing
the business or resolving the debt. See IBBI & IFC, supra note 44, at 13-15.
103. Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., (2019) SCC $ 1 (India).
104. See id. at 8; Gautam Bhatikar et al., Superior Court Clarifies the Restrictions
Under Section 29A IBC to Schemes of Compromise or Arrangement, MONDAQ (Apr. 16,
2021), www.mondaq.com/india/insolvencybankruptcy/1058488/supreme-court-clarifies
-the-restrictions-under-section-29a-ibc-to-schemes-of-compromise-or-arrangement
[https://perma.cc/PRL6-CUPD].
105. See generall! Misra & Feibelman, supra note 86; Jagatramka, (2019) SCC $ 1.
106. See Jagatramka, (2019) SCC $ 91.
107. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill
No. XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020) (beginning the CIRP Suspension March 25,
2020). Extended in September and December of 2020, the Suspension ended on March
25, 2021. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2020,
Bill No. XVII of 2020, # 10A (Sept. 23, 2020) (extending the effect of the Suspension
from 3 months to 6 months after enactment); The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Second Amendment) Act, 2020, Bill No. XXXIII of 2020, # 10A (Dec. 25, 2020)
(extending the Suspension 9 months after its issuance, for an additional 3 months).
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Suspension.108 Going forward, the restriction will likely continue to bar
some investors from proposing schemes and resolution plans, but all
parties currently seeking CIRP may file an application directly with the
NCLT, including investors based abroad and in the United States. 109
The level of U.S.-firm investment in India’s distressed debt and
capital markets is not insignificant.110 Despite long-standing limitations
on foreign investment and ownership of Indian companies, some major
U.S.-based investors and investment firms have a significant presence in
the Indian market.111 In recent years, global firms based in the United
States including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Apollo
Global Management, and Oaktree Capital Group have undertaken multimillion-dollar investments in Indian companies.112 In 2019, a consortium
led by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. that included Varde Partners LP agreed
to “one of the largest restructuring deals outside the [U.S.] bankruptcy

See Bhatikar et al., supra note 104.
CIRP may be initiated by a financial creditor under IBC Section 7, an operational
creditor under Section 9 and corporate applicant of corporate debtor under Section 10.
See Insolvency & Bankr. Bd. India, Frequentl! Asked Questions (FAQs) on Corporate
Insolvenc! Resolution Process (#CIRP$), Insolvency & Bankr. News 1, 1 (2020)
[hereinafter, “CIRP FAQs”]. CIRP applications may be filed without restriction since the
Suspension was lifted on March 25, 2021. Id.
110. See Bijou George et al., Global Funds Are Swooping in to Invest in India$s
Stressed Companies, PRINT (Nov. 18, 2020, 9:35 AM), https://theprint.in/economy/
global-funds-are-swooping-in-to-invest-in-indias-stressed-companies/546561/ [https://
perma.cc/2C3G-DKED].
111. See Jai S. Pathak et al., New Foreign Investment Restrictions Imposed b! India,
GIBSON DUNN (May 26, 2020), www.gibsondunn.com/new-foreign-investmentrestrictions-imposed-by-india/ [https://perma.cc/G9GM-6XHX].
112. Blackstone Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley were part of a $184 million deal in
2021 involving Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. See Rahul Satija & Suvashree Ghosh,
Indiabulls Housing Falls After Founder Sells to Blackstone, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2021,
10:06 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-15/blackstone-adia-said-tonear-indiabulls-housing-stake-purchase [https://perma.cc/843M-GL5D]. This deal was
entered after Oaktree’s $294 million loan to the same Indian firm, agreed upon in July
2020. See Bloomberg, Oaktree, Apollo Lead Giants Betting on Stressed India Assets,
MINT (Nov. 18, 2020, 10:38 AM), www.livemint.com/companies/news/oaktree-apollolead-giants-betting-on-stressed-india-assets-11605674164704.html
[https://perma.cc/8GN2-9AHN]. In 2019, a consortium led by Goldman Sachs Group
Inc., which included Varde Partners LP, agreed to “one of the largest restructuring deals
outside the [U.S.] bankruptcy court” in the purchase of $922 million of debt from an
Indian power company. George et al., supra note 110.
108.
109.
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court,” with the purchase of $922 million of debt from an Indian power
company.113
Now more than ever, foreign and U.S. firms are well-positioned to
invest in Indian companies. At least in the insurance industry, limitations
on foreign investment are being liberalized: the cap on foreign ownership
of an Indian insurance firm was raised in February 2021, from 49 percent
to 74 percent.114 Simultaneously, a path for foreign entities to invest
without government approval via an “automatic route” was recently
prescribed.115 Further enabling U.S. participation in India’s capital
markets, unique limitations were imposed on countries that
geographically border India.116 Because these restrictions do not apply
elsewhere, the regulations could have the secondary effect of increasing
the proportion of foreign investment from the United States, which faces
fewer restrictions comparatively. The aggregate of these conditions
provides a rosy outlook for the future United States-India investment
relationship.
B. FOREIGN INVESTORS CAN SEEK RECOURSE UNDER BITS
Foreign investors may assert their rights and find legal recourse for
the diminished value of their insolvency recovery through cross-border
arbitration under international investment treaties, including BITs.117
Investor-state disputes can arise under applicable BITs: treaty agreements
between two countries governing claims by foreign direct investors.118
BITs are the most important source of international investment law as
“[ma]ny of the agreements . . . are concerned with the far broader issue of
what happens when changes in regulations or other government policies
adversely affect the value of a foreign-owned asset.”119 BITs give foreign

113.
114.

George et al., supra note 110.
See Gaurav Dayal & Kartik Chatrath, Increase in FDI Limit: Allowing Foreign
Ownership and Control in Indian Insurance Companies, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 11, 2021),
www.lexology.com/commentary/corporate-financema/india/lakshmikumaran-sridharan/
increase-in-fdi-limit-allowing-foreign-ownership-and-control-in-indian-insurancecompanies [https://perma.cc/2NSY-QJBP].
115. Id. Until the automatic route was introduced, foreign investments in Indian
companies had to be reviewed by the governmental agency overseeing the relevant
sector. Id.
116. Pathak et al., supra note 111.
117. RANJAN, supra note 7, at 2.
118. See id. at 1-2.
119. Stiglitz, supra note 98.
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investors another venue, international arbitration tribunals, to seek
recoupment of insolvency-related losses incurred while CIRPs were not
available.
1. The Global Rise of BITs and Their Downfall in India
BITs first came into force in 1962 in response to an absence of
protections for foreign investors, deficient customary international law
(CIL), and increased liberalization following World War II; since then,
the volume of the agreements has continued to rise.120 In the 1960s
through the 1980s, BITs often signaled a state’s commitment to liberal
economic policies.121 Especially for developing countries, BITs were
adopted to attract foreign investment into the country and facilitate
economic growth.122 An exponential uptick in the number of BITs
occurred in the 1990s: on average, 147 BITs were entered each year
during the 1990s.123 By the end of 1999, 1,857 BITs were in effect across
the globe, with the total rising to 3,322 in 2017.124
BITs enhance protections for foreign investors by allowing them to
challenge a host state’s regulatory measures; a prevailing claimant
challenging a governmental measure under applicable BITs is eligible for
monetary compensation by the host state.125 In the vast majority of BITs,
the right to bring a claim requires adjudication through arbitration
proceedings, which are not required to be publicly released.126
Moreover, ISDS arbitration under BITs has continued to increase in
frequency as a result of the agreements’ broad and substantive guarantees

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3, 6.
Cree Jones, Do Enforcement Provisions Promote Investment? New Evidence
from a Natural E%periment in the Investment Treat! Network, SSRN (Aug. 7, 2019),
www.ssrn.com/abstract=3204964 [https://perma.cc/PAU9-WYUL] (“[There is] a
positive, significant, and robust correlation between the number of BITs signed by a
developing country and total FDI inflows to that country.”).
123. See Ranjan, supra note 7, at 4.
124. Id. at 4-5.
125. Id. at 2. The agreements “may require that the government compensate those
[foreign investors] that are adversely affected, and in doing so, . . . increase the costs of
governments changing regulations and or other government policies.” Stiglitz, supra note
98.
126. See Ranjan, supra note 7.
120.
121.
122.
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to foreign investors.127 With few or no provisions recognizing the host
state’s right to regulate in the public interest, regulatory measures often
give rise to broad BIT claims which ultimately require the host state to
compensate an aggrieved foreign investor.128 Foreign investors often
allege a breach of the (common) FET clause, which promises foreign
investors treatment that is not comparatively unfair to the treatment of
domestic parties.129 BIT claims also tend to resolve in favor of
investors,130 a trend that has sparked a global debate about whether the
practice is fair at all.131 Critiques of the promise of “fairness” question
BITs’ wide reach, the broad construction of foreign investors’ claims, and
the fact that “most BITs allow foreign investors to bring claims against
the host state without exhausting local remedies.”132
A state may become motivated to retrospectively exit BITs for many
reasons.133 At minimum, a foreign challenge of a governmental measures,
brought under a BIT, might interfere with a sovereign state’s right to
regulate.134 Making matters worse, many BITs allow parties to resolve
their claims in arbitration before exhausting local remedies;135 Such ISDS
tribunals tend to favor investors136 and lack transparency and
predictability.137 In 2015, the same year India became the 10th largest
127. Id. at 8. “From a negligible number in early 1990s, the total number of known
treaty-based ISDS cases rose to 904 as of 31 July 2018.” Id. at 10 (citing U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement [https://perma.cc/HN7L-P
WXQ]).
128. See RANJAN, supra note 7; Stiglitz, supra note 98.
129. See RANJAN, supra note 7, at 2.
130.

[O]f [all] cases decided on merits (that is, cases where the tribunal
ruled it had the jurisdiction and then went on to examine whether the
state breached its BIT obligations) the numbers change in favour of
the investor'investors have won 59 per cent cases whereas States
have won 41 per cent cases.
Id. at 11-12.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id.
133. See generall! RANJAN, supra note 7.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 11-12.
137. Id. at 17 (“[T]he procedural aspects of commercial arbitration, such as partyappointed arbitrators, secrecy in arbitral proceedings, lack of access to arbitral documents
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recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), India was challenged in 17
ISDS arbitration disputes.138 After the first ISDS arbitral award was
entered against the Indian government for over $4.75 million (USD), and
in light of the spike in ISDS challenges by foreign investors, India
unilaterally terminated 58 BITs in 2017.139 However, those agreements
remain effective as they relate to investments made before the termination
date.140 To improve its position in ISDS, India is currently seeking to renegotiate the terminated BITs with provisions more closely aligned with
the India Model BIT, promulgated in 2016.141
2. India$s Model BIT
India’s Model BIT was developed to mitigate the harmful effects of
overbroad ISDS jurisprudence favoring investors challenging State
actions.142 India described the shift as an attempt to provide “appropriate
protection to foreign investors in India” while “maintaining a balance
between investor’s rights and the government’s obligations.”143
The terms of the 2016 Model BIT is narrower in scope than the those
in previously active BITs, providing a more limited basis from which
future or re-negotiated agreements can be drafted.144 The Model BIT
sharply diverges from previous iterations by providing 38 highly detailed

including non-availability of arbitral awards (at times), have become characteristics of
ISDS”).
138. See Jones, supra note 122.
139. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)/Agreements, DEP’T ECON. AFFS. GOV’T
INDIA, www.dea.gov.in/bipa [https://perma.cc/XKD3-5LUE] (last updated Sept. 30,
2021); PRABHASH RANJAN ET AL., INDIA’S MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 8, 10
(2018). The arbitral award entered against the Indian government in White Industries v.
India was for $4,085,180 (USD), with attorneys and other fees owed to White Industries
Australia Ltd. in the amount of $670,249.82 (AUD) plus 8 percent interest. White Indus.
Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $ 16.1.1 (Nov. 30, 2011).
140. See Ranjan, supra note 7, at 39. India’s BITs are effective for 15 years after the
termination date. Id. This Note focuses on claims alleged under pre-existing BITs,
including those 58 that were unilaterally terminated by India, given that they remain
effective for investors who invested prior to the termination, and no BIT negotiations in
India have adopted the Model BIT thus far.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 12.
143. See id. at 39.
144. See id.
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provisions in seven chapters.145 Further, the Model BIT omits certain
clauses that ISDS tribunals have interpreted as giving rise to broad claims,
including the FET clause.146 Attempting reverse the wide reach of BIT
claims and balance the interests of both the State and investors may be a
commonsense response to the emerging ISDS jurisprudence, but such a
change will have far-reaching effects: “[b]oth termination of BITs and
launching negotiation for new BITs will impact as many as [84] countries
with whom India has signed a BIT.”147
Though the IBC does not provide a process for resolving crossborder insolvency like the widely adopted UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross Border Insolvency, the law allows the State to enter into bilateral
agreements with foreign countries in order to apply the provisions of the
IBC or foreign code.148 Under such agreements, including BITs, the
NCLT and other Indian insolvency authorities could request action by a
foreign court overseeing the cross-border insolvency proceedings. 149
However, no such bilateral agreements have been entered into with India,

145.
146.

Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6, at 7-8 (2017).
See id. at 26, 52 (describing that FET provisions have “become a catch-all []
capable of sanctioning many legislative, regulatory, and administrative actions of the host
state,” and that “[t]he Model BIT contains a narrow definition of investment, an
extremely narrow FET-type provision”); Lucia Raimanova, Indian Model Bilateral
Investment Treat!, ALLEN & OVERY, (Aug. 5, 2016), www.allenovery.com/engb/global/news-and-insights/publications/indian-model-bilateral-investment-treaty
[https://perma.cc/J2SJ-UQ63] (“Article 3.1 seeks to replace the autonomous [FET]
standard with the customary international law standard of protection [for investors].”).
147. Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6, at 9.
148.
The Code enables the Government to enter into bilateral agreements
with foreign countries for applying the provisions of the Code . . . .
The ILC has proposed to add a Chapter to the Code to introduce a
globally accepted and well recognized cross border insolvency
framework, the [UNCITRAL] Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency, considering the fact that some corporates transact
businesses in more than one jurisdiction and have assets across many
jurisdictions.
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE, supra note 67, at 1617.
149. Karan Singh Chandhiok, Restructuring & Insolvenc! Comparative Guide,
MONDAQ (Apr. 26, 2021), www.mondaq.com/india/insolvencybankruptcyre-structuring/
939078/restructuring-insolvency-comparative-guide [https://perma.cc/MGZ5-FHHH].
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and the framework for cross-border insolvency remains complicated and
difficult to apply.150
II. THREE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING FAIR AND E"UITABLE
TREATMENT CLAIMS
A. ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION OF FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Notwithstanding differences in each BIT a country ratifies, the
overarching aim of such treaties is to prevent a host state from unduly
interfering with a foreign investor’s rights.151 Typical BIT protections
include claims for a broad interpretation of the definition of the term
“investment,” fair and equitable treatment of investors, most favored
nation treatment, and full protection and security.152 These clauses are
common to all Indian BITs, though “the language of these provisions
undergoes minor variations from one treaty to the other.”153 The
provisions restrict a host state from directly or indirectly expropriating
property of foreign investors, prohibiting regulation in the public interest
without the need to compensate foreign investors.154 Going further, they
also “impos[e] obligations on host states to accord [FET] to foreign
invest[ors],” and “allow[] for repatriation of profits subject to conditions
agreed to between the two countries.”155
Because BITs protect foreign investors at the expense of a state’s
regulatory power, “at times, the rights of foreign investors and host state’s
right to regulate come face-to-face.”156 Given the CIRP Suspension,
judicial overwhelm, and inexorable delay, foreign investors in insolvent
Indian companies might seek compensation for the asset value diminution
under applicable BITs, claiming the State measure effectively breached a
promise of FET.157 While some defenses against ISDS challenges justify
a State measure with a public health explanation, such defenses are not

150.
151.

See id.
See Ranjan, supra note 7, at 1 (citing RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3 (2012)).
152. Id., at 42.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 12.
157. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42.
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affirmative against broad FET claims.158 The standard requires that host
states treat foreign investors fairly and in a manner equivalent to the
treatment of domestic nationals and foreign investors of other
countries.159
The FET clause is included in the large majority of BITs and gives
rise to broad, sweeping claims; it has therefore emerged as the most
important BIT standard of treatment.160 Beyond this, what FET entails is
imprecise, effectively giving discretion to ISDS tribunals to determine the
scope of the standard.161 Because of the discretion granted to ISDS
tribunals and the absence of clear normative content defining FET, the
claims have become numerous and FET violation allegations overutilized.162 FET violations have become a catch-all, “capable of
sanctioning many legislative, regulatory, and administrative actions of the
host state.”163
One interpretation of FET defines the claim’s minimum standard
through CIL.164 This interpretation equates the FET standard with CIL
standards, which, unfortunately, have also been criticized as lacking clear
definition.165 However, CIL has been described as, at the very least,
establishing “a floor below which treatment of foreign investors must not
fall, even if a government were not acting in a discriminatory manner.”166
Although standards established under CIL can help inform the meaning
of FET, because arbitral decisions lack the binding effect of precedent,
158. See Prabhash Ranjan, COVID-19, India and Indirect E%propriation: Is the Police
Powers Doctrine a Reliable Defence?, 13 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 205 (2020); Ranjan,
supra note 7, at 8, 10.
159. See Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6.
160. See id. at 26; Ranjan, supra note 7, at 150-51.
161. Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6; Ranjan, supra note 7, at 153.
162. See Ranjan, supra note 7, at 153.
163. See Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6, at 26; Ranjan, supra note 7, at 150-51.
164. See Ranjan, supra note 7, at 150-51.
165. See Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6, at 26-27. This standard is particularly
compelling in BITs which link the FET provision to CIL. See Ranjan, supra note 7, at
151.
166. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, ad hoc Trib., Partial Award, $ 259 (Nov. 13, 2000),
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LMC-WEUL]. There is no precise definition of CIL that is universally
agreed upon. CIL has also been described as promising, “an alien is protected against
unacceptable measures of the host state by rules of international law which are
independent of those of the host State.” See Ranjan, supra note 7, at 151 (citing RUDOLPH
DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3
(2012)).
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competing interpretations of FET have been applied, and remain at issue,
within a single jurisdiction.167
Landmark cases Tecmed v. Me%ico and Cairn v. India handed down
competing interpretations of the FET promise.168 Because the FET

167. Compare Cairn v. India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$ 1701-1707,
1718-1722 (Dec. 21, 2020) (citing Rumeli Telekom A.S. & Telsim Mobil
Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award,
$ 609 (July 29, 2008), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H8Y4-RE9P]) (finding the FET standard autonomous of CIL); Joseph
Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Liability, $ 284 (Jan. 14, 2010), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0453.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M38-FR7V]; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi
A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, $ 178 (27
Aug., 2009), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0075.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2HWQ-NFRJ]; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula et al. v. Romania (I), ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, $ 520 (Dec. 11, 2013), www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw3036.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NJE-SE8D]), with White Indus.
Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award $ 10.3.6 (2011) (citing Zachary
Douglas, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treat! Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko
and Methane% 22 ARB. INT’L 27, 28 (2006)) and Saluka Investments BV v. Czech
Republic, PCA Case Repository, Partial Award, $ 304 (2006).
168. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
968 (2020) (recognizing “the emergence of the explicit equation of FET and the
customary minimum standard of treatment in treaty texts has been a response to the
excessively broad interpretation of the FET standard by investment tribunals and is
intended to clarify the original understanding of states as to the interpretation of the FET
standard.”). These interpretations did not consistently evolve over time: the
chronologically first case, Tecmed v. Me%ico, adopts a very broad autonomous FET
standard. T(cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, (May 29, 2003). However, the Indian Tribunal in the next
case, White Indus. v. India, tied the FET standard to the minimum standards set by CIL
and explicitly denounced the standard in Tecmed v. Me%ico as lacking a workability,
instead providing a mere description of a “perfect world, to which all states should aspire
but very few (if any) will ever attain.” See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India,
ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $ 10.3.6 (Nov. 30, 2011) (citing Zachary Douglas, Nothing if
Not Critical for Investment Treat! Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and Methane% 22
ARB. INT’L 27, 28 (2006) and Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, PCA Case
Repository, Partial Award, $ 304 (2006)). The final case this paper uses to describe the
FET interpretations, Cairn v. India, returns to the broad, independent interpretation of the
FET standard. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final
Award, $$ 1701-1707 (2020). Overall, each ISDS tribunal has the discretion to interpret
the standard however they deem appropriate, dependent on the text of the individual BIT
as well as the interpretations and preceding ISDS decisions they deem relevant. See
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standard has been described and applied in a multitude of ways, FET has
become so broad it is sometimes equated with the CIL standard.169 The
Tecmed v. Me%ico arbitral award described an interpretation of FET that
is autonomous of CIL, requiring that a state “provide international
investment treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were
taken into account by the foreign investor [at the time of the investment
decision].”170 Although the ISDS Arbitral Tribunal in Cairn v. India
acknowledged that CIL can help inform the meaning of FET, the Tribunal
ultimately found the FET standard autonomous from, and broader than,
CIL.171 Distinguishing the standards, the Cairn Tribunal explained:
A state may breach its FET obligation if its conduct is arbitrary,
unreasonable, discriminatory, involves a lack of due process or a
denial of justice, or is otherwise grossly unfair or unjust. It may also
breach its FET obligation if it undermines the principles of reasonable
stabilit! or predictabilit! or in violation of the investor’s legitimate
e%pectations.172

Under this Cairn standard, a foreign investor challenging any state
measure, including the CIRP Suspension, may show that the FET clause
of an applicable BIT was breached by stating a valid claim that the
measure either: (1) denies them due justice; (2) disrupts the principles of
legal certainty, including where the measure is arbitrary; and (3) disturbs
the investor’s legitimate expectations.173 This Section proceeds to
describe what these claims entail and how an investor may assert each

Lorenzo Cotula, Investment Contracts and International Law: Charting a Research
Agenda, 31 EUR. J. INT’L L. 353, 365 (2020).
169. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1702, 1704 (2020) (rejecting the interpretation by other tribunals and scholars that the
FET clause is equivalent to the “minimum standard” provided by CIL because the
language of the relevant BIT refers only to “fair and equitable treatment” as opposed to
those which explicitly refer to CIL, and finding that despite the FET clause sharing some
elements with CIL, it is a more broad, autonomous standard); Ranjan & Anand, supra
note 6, at 27.
170. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.3.5 (Nov. 30, 2011) (citing T(cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, $ 154 (May 29, 2003)).
171. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1701-1707 (2020).
172. Id. $$ 1718-1722 (emphasis added) (surveying tribunal decisions in which the
FET standard was found autonomous of CIL standards).
173. Id.
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claim to challenge the CIRP Suspension; it will then go on to analyze the
weaknesses in each allegation.
B. ENUMERATED CHALLENGES TO THE SUSPENSION BY A FOREIGN
INVESTOR: THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Denial of Justice Claims: Legal Standards
The promise that a foreign investor will be treated fairly and
equitably may be assessed under the widely recognized denial of justice
standard.174 Analysis of a denial of justice claim begins with an
assessment of whether the result of the state’s action is egregious, which
depends on whether justice has been denied in a manner breaching FET:
[W]hether, at an international level and having regard to generally
accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can
conclude in light of all the available facts that the impugned decision
was clearly improper and discreditable with the result that the
investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable treatment.175

Under this standard, the test for establishing denial of justice is an
exceptionally high threshold, “requir[ing] the demonstration of %a
particularly serious shortcoming and egregious conduct that shocks, or at
least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety.’”176
In White Indus. v. India, an investor spent 9 years seeking recourse
for an unfavorable investment outcome that resulted from a State
action.177 The investor alleged that the case’s 9-year journey through
India’s court system amounted to an undue denial of justice that breached
the promise of FET within the Australia-India BIT.178 The decision issued
five factors to assess when determining whether judicial delay amounts
to a denial of justice, including: (1) the complexity of the proceedings; (2)
the need for swiftness to the particular case and claimant; (3) the behavior
of the litigants involved; (4) the significance of the interest at stake; and
174. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $$
10.4.4-.10 (Nov. 30, 2011).
175. Id. $ 10.4.6 (quoting Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AJ)/99/2, Award, $ 127 (Oct. 11, 2002)).
176. Id. $ 10.4.6 (quoting Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case
Repository, Partial Award, $ 244 (2010)).
177. Id. $ 4.3.5.
178. Id. $ 10.4.4.
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(5) the behavior of the courts themselves.179 The inquiry of whether
judicial delay amounts to a denial of justice is highly fact-sensitive, and
“international law has no strict standards to assess whether court delays
are a denial of justice.”180
The White Industries decision cited several facts to support its
finding that justice was not denied in the face of 9 years of adjudication.181
Although the investor sought local and international remedies over nearly
a decade before reaching a resolution, the case moved at a typical pace
through the Indian court system during the first 5 years.182 Because the
award from previous court decisions accrued interest during the
remaining 4 years of the case, monetary justice was not denied.183 The
investor was unable to claim that it was surprised by the delays as the
overburdened Indian judiciary was serving a population of over 1.2 billion
people, and the country was rapidly developing.184 Ultimately, because
the delay contained no particularly serious shortcoming or egregious
conduct that could shock or surprise a sense of judicial propriety, the
investor’s claim that they were denied justice when faced with severe
judicial delay failed.185
a. Challenge 1: Alleging Judicial Delay Denies Due Justice
Foreign investors may successfully claim the promise of FET was
breached because they were denied access to justice when their claims
faced lengthy court delays, a situation potentially exacerbated by the
CIRP Suspension.186 By delaying the resolution of the insolvency claim,
the Suspension may indirectly harm the value of an investor’s recovery.187
Because lifting the CIRP Suspension is likely to overwhelm, and
therefore delay, the legal system’s ability to resolve insolvent firms, a
Id. $ 10.4.10.
Id. $ 10.4.9 (citing Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 September 2009, $ 155
(2009)).
181. Id. $$ 10.4.22-.24.
182. Id. $$ 10.4.21-.22.
183. Id. $ 10.4.14.
184. Id. $ 10.4.18.
185. Id. $ 10.4.23.
186. Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1718-1722 (2020).
187. See Bangar, supra note 3, at 119; WORLD BANK, supra note 80, at 30 (“Rapid
recovery ensures that market values are realized and avoids the loss of value due to
delayed enforcement and reinvestment opportunities”).
179.
180.
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company’s asset value may significantly diminish before distribution or
successful reorganization.188 Thus, a foreign investor could argue that it
was denied access to deserved justice during a critical time of the
insolvency, when it likely would have recovered more on its claims,
constituting a breach of FET.
To support such a denial of justice claim, the investor might show
that the value of its assets in the company declined from the onset of
insolvency to the time the CIRP filings became available in March
2021.189 Its claim may be further supported by demonstrating the
diminished recovery value is due solely to the delays imposed by the
Suspension and the State’s increasingly slow judiciary. Additionally,
some foreign investors may allege that the recent Arun Kumar
Jagatramka190 decision heightens the significance of the interest at stake
within CIRP because they may no longer propose a scheme under
Companies Act Section 230.191 These arguments underscore the necessity
of swiftness in CIRPs and the significance of the interest at stake;192 such
factors are particularly important to the investor’s claim given that the
remaining three elements for consideration of a judicial delay claim are
only relevant where an investor pursued a resolution through local
remedies or the judicial system.193
To speak to the next factor, the issue’s importance, some investors
may allege the heightened importance of CIRP given this new restriction
on their ability to propose a scheme, further denying them justice by
treating them differently from domestic creditors.194 Finally, an investor
could cite the insolvent balance sheet and outstanding financial
obligations to underly the issue’s significance.

188. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $$
10.4.4-.10 (Nov. 30, 2011) (acknowledging judicial delay can constitute a denial of
justice breaching FET promises under BITs).
189. See id. $ 10.4.14 (finding differences in compensation through court resolutions
is relevant to the significance factor of a denial of justice claim).
190. See supra Section I.A.iii (discussing how the restriction this case imposes on
foreign entities interacts with other limitations on foreign parties’ rights).
191. See Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., (2019) SCC $ 91
(India).
192. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.4.14 (Nov. 30, 2011).
193. Id. $ 10.4.10.
194. See Jagatramka, (2019) SCC $$ 66, 91.
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Finally, an investor may emphasize the lost value in the firm’s assets
and going concern while awaiting the end of the CIRP Suspension.195 To
establish that the proceedings required expediency, foreign investors may
underscore the rate at which their insolvency recovery depreciated in
value during the CIRP Suspension.196 Together, these arguments support
a claim that the significant harm caused while proceedings were
suspended was the direct result of the State’s action and the judicial
system’s delayed conditions. Though an investor could assert denial of
justice to challenge the CIRP Suspension, allegations of legal uncertainty,
arbitrariness, and disruption of legitimate expectations could also
establish such a violation of FET.
2. Legal Uncertaint! and Arbitrariness Claims: Legal Standards
Under the broader, autonomous FET regime, the Cairn Tribunal
found that allowing individuals to predict the legal consequences of their
conduct is “one of the main characteristics and functions of the law” and
of the FET standard.197 This requires a host state compensate an investor
for the harm caused by an arbitrary governmental measure.198 An arbitrary
measure is one that does not reflect the tradition of CIL or the rule of law,
inherent in which is the principle of legal certainty.199 “Many ISDS
tribunals, . . . have held that if a state acts in a manifestly arbitrary manner,
it breaches [CIL]”; These tribunals can find that a breach is due to

195. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $$
10.4.10 (Nov. 30, 2011) (setting the significance of the interest at stake as a factor
relevant to whether judicial delay caused an investor to be denied justice).
196. See id. (setting the need for swiftness as a factor relevant to whether judicial
delay caused an investor to be denied justice). See also M/S. Innoventive Indus. Ltd. v.
ICICI Bank & ANR., (2018) 1 SCC 407, $ 12 (India) (recognizing the risk of a firm’s
atrophy where insolvency proceedings are not swift and efficient).
197. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
1740 (2020).
198. See RANJAN, supra note 7, at 8.
199. Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $ 1741
(2020) (citing Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy),
I.C.J. Reports 1989, $ 128, which recognized legitimate expectations as a fundamental
component of the rule of law where an “%arbitrary action’ [was] %substituted for the rule
of law’” and was thus found unlawful). See also Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6, at 30
(describing arbitrariness as a fundamental aspect of the FET standard and related to the
principle of legal certainty).
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disruption of legal certainty.200 Where such a breach is found, that conduct
may also breach FET.201
The principle of legal certainty requires a state’s laws to be clear,
certain, and, therefore, predictable to inform the conduct of individuals
and entities.202 Rules must provide advance notice of the consequences of
unlawful behavior.203 However, the principle of legal certainty is not
absolute and the expectation can be overcome when a host state’s action
was undertaken for a legitimate public purpose or in the public’s
interest.204 The justification for such state action, even if in the public
interest, must be proportional to the harm prevented and balance against
the burdens placed on foreign investors.205
The Cairn decision handed down a balancing test to assess
proportionality: “[T]he [state] measures should not be more burdensome
for the individual’s rights and interests than required by the pursued
public purpose, especially if a less burdensome measure would be
available to satisfy the same public purpose.”206 In that decision, the
Tribunal also clarified that rules applying retroactively must be justified
not only by a public policy objective, but that justification must warrant
the retroactive application of that change.207 In order to satisfy the added
requirement of specifically justifying the retroactivity, the state must be
“facing a situation where the new rule would not fulfil its purpose . . . if
200. See Ranjan & Anand, supra note 6, at 30 (the additional manifest arbitrariness
standard “ensure[s] that foreign investors have recourse when host states act [] in bad
faith or in an irrational or manifestly unreasonable manner.”).
201. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
1741 (2020).
202. See id. $$ 1757-1760, 1788.
203. See id. $ 1757.
204. See id. $$ 1760, 1788-1790.
205. See id.
206. Id. $ 1788.
207. Id. $ 1760, 1790. Additionally, to balance these interests proportionally:

(i) the retroactive application of a new regulation is only justified
when the prospective application of that regulation would not achieve
the specific public purpose sought, and (ii) the importance of that
specific public purpose must manifestly outweigh the prejudice
suffered by the individuals affected by the retroactive application of
the regulation.
Id.

2022]

RIDING THE WAVE

657

its effects were only prospective.”208 This requirement is not typically
met.209
a. Challenge 2: Alleging Arbitrary Suspension Hinders Investor’s
Certainty
The CIRP Suspension will almost certainly cause severe delays for
companies seeking a judicially-blessed resolution of their financial
distress.210 An investor might argue that the year-long CIRP Suspension
subverts the purpose of the IBC regime to invite foreign investment by
providing a reliable, predictable framework of rules and thus, legal
certainty.211 Because India’s bankruptcy regime was so strengthened by
the 2016 amendments, a foreign investor may argue the strong legal
certainty provided under the IBC was undermined by the Suspension and
resultant judicial delays.212 While the Suspension is now lifted, because
insolvent companies were prevented from initiating CIRP for an entire
year, their race to file for such proceedings could flood and overwhelm
the NCLT and NCLAT, resulting in further delays during which severe
attenuation of value can occur.213 Given this potential diminution in value,
an investor may allege the disruption in IBC legal certainty breaches the
FET clause of an applicable BIT, seeking compensation to the damaged
value of its recovery.214
However unfortunate for foreign investors, the financial harm they
faced may be overcome by the test’s balancing aspect, as the Suspension
could be justified by the unprecedented pandemic conditions. Should a
foreign investor fail on this particular iteration of FET claim, it has one
remaining weapon in their arsenal: disruption of legitimate expectations.

Id. $ 1790.
Id.
Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42. See generall!
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, # 10A.
211. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
1750 (2020) (defining the legal system’s role imposing predictable obligations, sanctions,
and rules, and the principle of legal certainty as rooted in the rule of law).
212. See REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 5 (2020);
Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42 (warning of potential
judicial delay given the increased volume of stressed insolvent Indian companies).
213. See Bangar, supra note 3, at 119.
214. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
1750 (2020) (analyzing breach of the FET clause through disruption of legal certainty);
Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42.
208.
209.
210.
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3. Disruption of Legitimate E%pectation Claims: Legal Standards
Tribunals have found FET promises breached where a host state’s
actions upset a foreign investor’s legitimate expectations as to how its
investments would be treated under the state’s laws and regulations.215
Notwithstanding whether an ISDS tribunal finds the FET standard
autonomous or reliant on CIL:
[A]n overwhelming majority of cases support[] the contention that . .
. where the state has acted in such a way so as to generate a legitimate
expectation in the investor and that investor has relied on that
expectation to make its investment, action by the state that reverses or
destroys those legitimate expectations will be in breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard.216

In other words, “[t]here must be an %unambiguous affirmation’ or
%definitive, unambiguous and repeated assurances’ . . . targeted at a
specific person or identifiable group.”217 It is necessary that the state
conduct is specifically and unambiguously related to the investor’s
legitimate expectation to constitute a breach.218
The White Industries Tribunal ultimately found that State officers’
reassurances that “it was safe for [the investor] to invest in India; that the
Indian legal system was, to all intents and purposes, the same as the
215. See White Indus. v. India, $ 10.3.7 (citing ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLU)S
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
281-82 (2009)). See also Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository,
Final Award, $$ 862, 885, 915-930, 1731 (2020). While some tribunals recognize the
disruption of an investor’s legitimate expectations as a principle incorporated into the
FET standard through CIL, the Cairn v. India Tribunal stated clearly, “the doctrine of
%legitimate expectations’ is not to be found in general rules of international law, but can
be found in the FET standard of investment treaties.” See also Ranjan & Anand, supra
note 6, at 25-31. While the doctrine of legitimate expectations is undoubtedly
fundamental to FET, its precise origins are not determinative of the standard’s
applicability to a FET claim analysis. Id. Compare Cairn v. India, PCA Case Repository,
Final Award (Dec. 21, 2020) with White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc
Trib., Final Award (Nov. 30, 2011).
216. Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula et al. v. Romania (I), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20,
Final Award, $ 667 (Dec. 11, 2013). See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case
Repository, Final Award, $ 885 (2020).
217. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.3.7 (Nov. 30, 2011) (citing ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLU)S PARADELL, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 281-82 (2009)).
218. Id.
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Australian Legal system; and, accordingly, [the investor] could expect
fair treatment” suffered from “vagueness and generality” and were thus
incapable of giving rise to an investor’s reasonable legitimate expectation
to have been breached under the FET standard.219 The Tribunal therefore
found no breach of the FET clause because the investor’s expectations
were not supported by specific promises made by the appropriate
authority, the State.220 In such a case, the investor’s expectations were not
legitimate.221
a. Challenge 3: Alleging Suspension Disrupted Investor’s Legitimate
Expectations
A foreign investor’s argument that the CIRP Suspension and
resultant judicial delays constitute a disruption of its legitimate
expectations may be summarized as follows:222 because the economic and
business environment in India substantially improved since the IBC’s
development in 2016, which has proven much more efficient than the
previous legal regime, a foreign investor may have reasonably and
legitimately expected the IBC would efficiently govern any future
insolvency claims.223 Further, before the Arun Kumar Jagatramka
decision prohibited some foreign investors from proposing a scheme of
arrangement or a resolution plan in CIRP, foreign investors may have also
expected greater abilities to propose a scheme of arrangement under
Section 230 of the Companies Act.224 Foreign investors may conclude by
arguing that the abrupt change disrupted their legitimate expectations of
the applicable legal framework.
Prior to the enactment of the IBC, the time taken to resolve
bankruptcies ranged from 6.5 to 11 years.225 Currently, investors can
expect CIRP resolutions to face significant delays in the NCLT, during
Id. $$ 10.3.2, 10.3.17.
Id. $$ 10.3.2, 10.3.9.
Id.
See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.3.7 (Nov. 30, 2011). In order to properly state this claim, the investor must be someone
who invested after the 2016 IBC became effective because the insolvency resolution
regime prior to 2016 was significantly less efficient, taking as long as 11 years to reach
an insolvency resolution. See also Contractor et al., supra note 23, at 5.
223. See REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 5.
224. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.3.7 (Nov. 30, 2011). See also Contractor et al., supra note 23, at 5.
225. See Contractor et al., supra note 23, at 5.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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which the insolvent company’s going concern and asset value will
diminish before distribution or reorganization.226 An investor may allege
neither the conditions making resolutions proceed 160 percent slower
than the statutory mandate nor the diminution of company value during
that time were foreseeable at the time of its initial investment.
Even with delays in the NCLT, proceedings in the fourth quarter of
2020 took 433 days227 on average"much less than the 11 years required in
some pre-IBC resolutions.228 Thus, a claim that the State’s current
bankruptcy regime upset an investor’s legitimate expectations of
expediency and swift resolution, constituting a breach of the FET clause,
is the weakest of all FET claims.229 While there are other methods of
claiming the FET promise was breached, weaknesses plague all the
claims, which are ultimately unlikely to prevail in an arbitral analysis.
III. FOREIGN INVESTORS; FET CLAIMS WILL FAIL: WEAKNESSES
INHERENT IN CHALLENGES TO THE CIRP SUSPENSION
Foreign investors that challenge the Suspension by alleging it
breached the FET clause of an applicable BIT will fail.230 Even if an
investor did prevail, requiring the State to compensate the value it lost
during the Suspension, the amount recoverable would probably be
insufficient to justify the case.231 What could become very a costly
arbitration case may not be worthwhile for small and medium investors
who could only recover the value CIRP failed to recoup during the
Suspension.232 In light of robust debate about the validity of the

226. See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, # 29A (prohibiting foreign
investors from independently initiating CIRP); Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed
Insolvencies, supra note 42, at 2.
227. See also July-Sept. 2020 IBBI Quarterly, supra note 28, at 20. While this is over
160 percent the statutory mandate requiring a resolution within 270 days, it is a nearly
incomprehensible improvement from the pre-IBC delays. Compare id. with Contractor et
al., supra note 23, at 5.
228. See Contractor et al., supra note 23, at 5.
229. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.3 (Nov. 30, 2011).
230. Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1718-1722 (2020).
231. See RANJAN, supra note 7, at 8; Stiglitz, supra note 98.
232. The result in White Industries Australia Ltd. v. Republic of India required the
Indian government pay $670,249.82 (USD) plus 8 percent interest in attorneys and other
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Suspension, where the potential recovery would be significant, there is a
strong possibility that foreign investors will bring such a challenge.
Indeed, a domestic investor already challenged the measure on
Constitutional grounds by arguing the Suspension, imposed in a historic
moment, allowed rapid depreciation of company value to proceed
unabated, without recourse or recovery.233
As discussed in Part II, under Cairn’s broad construction of the FET
standard, a foreign investor could allege the Suspension breaches a FET
clause by claiming the delays associated with the Ordinance either: (1)
denied them deserved justice, (2) disrupted requisite legal certainty, or (3)
disturbed their legitimate expectations.234 However, weaknesses inherent
in each of these arguments will likely leave the aforementioned
challenges dead on arrival. It is highly unlikely a challenge could
overcome the fact that the Suspension treats foreign investors and
domestic creditors identically, the measure did not risk legal uncertainty,
and State officials would not have promised an expedient resolution.
fees. White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $ 16.1.1
(Nov. 30, 2011).
233. Rajeev Suri, claimant in Delhi High Court, challenged the CIRP Suspension,
alleging: (1) the Suspension was “irrational, arbitrary, unjust and mala fide” as it prevents
entities from exercising their statutory rights; (2) it pushed companies towards
liquidation, discouraged entrepreneurship, and defeated the objectives of the IBC; (3) the
issuance of the suspension was beyond the powers granted to the Government under
Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; and (4) the suspension would result
in further deterioration of the insolvent entity, making the restructuring or revival of the
entity unviable. Chirali Jain & Chahak Agarwal, Lifting the Suspension on Section 10 of
IBC- Need of the Hour?, HIDAYATULLAH NAT’L L. UNIV. CORP. & COM. L. BLOG (Aug.
19, 2020), www.hnluccls.in/2020/08/19/lifting-the-suspension-on-section-10-of-ibcneed-of-the-hour/. Ultimately, the petitioner withdrew the challenge. See Gurmukh
Choudhri, Section 10 A of the Insolvenc! & Bankruptc! Code, 2016 Dispensable or
Indispensable?, TMT L. PRAC. (July 1, 2021), https://tmtlaw.co.in/section-10-a-of-theinsolvency-bankruptcy-code-2016-dispensable-or-indispensable/. Another challenge
was subsequently filed, alleging the Suspension “discriminates against persons and
personal guarantors” because “while the provision suspends the enforcement of sections
7, 9 and 10 of the IBC against corporate debtors, it excludes persons and personal
guarantors from its ambit.” Id.
234. While the Suspension only explicitly halted new CIRP proceedings, which are
reorganizations, 49.7 percent of insolvency proceedings initiated as CIRP resolutions
ended in liquidation in 2020. July-Sept. 2020 IBBI Quarterly, supra note 28, at 17. Given
that about half of CIRPs end in liquidation, this Note assumes the Suspension halted
filings that would result in both reorganizations and liquidations. Further, the claims
stated by the hypothetical foreign investor in this Note reflect arguments available in the
event the insolvency proceedings would result in liquidation or reorganization.
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A. JUSTICE IS NOT DENIED TO FOREIGN INVESTORS TREATED
IDENTICALLY TO DOMESTIC COUNTERPARTS
Because the Suspension applies equally to domestic and foreign
investors, weakness plagues potential claims by foreign investors alleging
judicial delay denied deserved justice. Under IBC Section 4, foreign and
domestic investors alike may initiate a CIRP if the debtor is insolvent.235
Though some foreign investors are now restricted from proposing a
resolution plan or scheme of arrangement, the parties may still vote on
such proposals.236 Throughout the duration of the Suspension, foreign
investors were not restricted from proposing a scheme of arrangement
under Section 230, which remained an alternative option for insolvent
Indian corporations to resolve outside the IBC.237 Thus, even if an investor
successfully argues the Suspension is unfair, the Suspension’s effect
barring all new CIRPs substantially weakens the claim.
Given the equal application of the Suspension, the Arun Kumar
Jagatramka decision does not heighten the importance of CIRP. Because
the case places limits on the same foreign investors who were previously
restricted from proposing a plan for CIRP resolution, the availability of
CIRP would not provide a unique opportunity for those investors to
participate in the firm’s resolution. Thus, the decision does not play a role
in demonstrating the significance of resolution through CIRP. 238
Admittedly, these restrictions do treat foreign investors differently from
domestic creditors. However, the Suspension treats foreign and domestic
creditors equally, and both the IBC and Companies Act frameworks
remain available in all other aspects to foreign creditors and the Indian
companies in which they are invested, including rights to initiate

235. CIRP may be initiated by a financial creditor under IBC Section 7, an operational
creditor under Section 9, and corporate applicant of corporate debtor under Section 10.
See CIRP FAQs, supra note 109, at 1-2. There are no restrictions on the meaning of
financial creditor, operational creditor, or corporate applicant based on geographic
location or foreign status. Id.
236. See Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., (2019) SCC $ 91
(India) (failing to rule on any provision that would impact or impair the existing voting
scheme).
237. See id. $ 1, 91 (decided March 15, 2021, 10 days before the year-long Suspension
was lifted).
238. See id. at 2.
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proceedings and vote for a resolution.239 Absent other discrepancies in the
legal treatment of foreign and domestic investors, the restriction is likely
insufficient to show the significance of the interest at stake.
While economic arguments might help demonstrate the weight of a
foreign investor’s losses, such arguments are not likely enough to
establish the need for a swift resolution envisioned by the White Industries
Tribunal, especially because of the pecuniary nature of the harm.240
Further, any interest that accrues on the investor’s insolvency recovery
while the proceeding is pending wholly undermines the need for swift
resolution.241 Given the two factors are the basis for a challenger’s
strongest arguments, without showing a need for swift resolution, the
claim is significantly weakened. While the investor may succeed in
demonstrating that judicial delay impaired or will impair the value of its
recovery, it will meet, at best, only two of the five White Industries
factors. Although that decision provided three additional factors to
consider when resolving the inquiry, none are relevant to a claim that has
not yet been filed, or in a case where a foreign investor did not utilize any
of the local remedies available.242
Further, the standard for a violation of FET through the denial of a
foreign investor’s access to justice is a high bar, requiring “egregious
conduct.”243 A foreign investor’s challenge to the CIRP Suspension is
terminally impaired by the fact that India likely did not promulgate the

239. See also CIRP FAQs, supra note 109, at 2-3, 14; Jagatramka, (2019) SCC $ 91
(India) (narrowly extending the limitations under IBC Sections 29A and 35(f)(1) only to
proposed schemes of arrangement under Companies Act Section 230). See generall! The
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, ## 7, 9, 10, 10A (beginning the CIRP
Suspension on March 25, 2020).
240. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.4.14 (Nov. 30, 2011) (recognizing the difference between criminal proceedings, where
there is a particular need for urgent resolution in light of due process and human rights
issues, as opposed to commercial matters).
241. See id. (finding the need for swift resolution was significantly “less compelling”
where interest accrued during the period of judicial delay).
242. See id. $ 10.4.10 (setting the unrelated factors: the complexity of the proceedings;
the behavior of the litigants involved; and the behavior of the courts themselves).
243. Id. $ 10.4.6 (quoting Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic
of Ecuador, PCA Case Repository, Partial Award, $ 244 (2010) (“[T]he test . . . requires
the demonstration of %a particularly serious shortcoming and egregious conduct that
shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety.’”)).
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Ordinance in bad faith, but in an attempt to protect its economy from
fragility during a pandemic and a resultant period of economic distress.244
The essential nature of social distancing further weakens an
investor’s challenge; the Suspension and court delay were unavoidable
downsides to protecting against the unforeseeable, deadly pandemic. The
Suspension is justifiable as a practical attempt to protect Indian
companies from avoidable, permanent closure.245 It would have been a
monumental task for the Indian government to accept new CIRP filings
while adjusting to strictly virtual connections given the unreliable
availability of wifi throughout the nation.246 Given that India is a
developing country with over 1.2 billion people, some judicial delay is to
be expected, and could not reasonably be considered egregious.247 Indeed,
the Indian court system has long been overburdened, and adjustments to
a post-COVID world merely exacerbated these existing conditions.248
Even 9 years of pendency within the courts did not constitute delays
sufficient to deny a claimant due justice.249 No realistic insolvency
proceeding would take that long after the IBC’s effect, even if facing
delays exacerbated by the Suspension. In light of these facts, a reasonable
investor would have mitigated its expectations of expediency, including
at the time of its investment.250 As such, the investor’s challenge, based
on unreasonable expectations of expediency in the courts, would fail.
At first glance, economic and financial arguments may be
compelling ways for a foreign investor to claim the Suspension denied it
244. Id. (quoting Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case Repository, Partial Award, $ 244 (2010)).
245. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1692, 1756-1757 (2020) (considering the government’s public purpose relevant to the
host State’s defense against an investor’s FET claim).
246. Vijay Kumar Singh & Shilpika Pandey, COVID-19&Law and Polic! Response
in India, 5 UPES L. REV. 1 (2020). See generall! Meghna Kantharia, Online School
Education in India during Coronavirus Pandemic: Benefits and Challenges, RSCH. J.
HUMANS. & SOC. SCIS. (Jul. 19, 2020).
247. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.4.18 (Nov. 30, 2011) (citing India’s size and status as developing as legitimate
explanations for the “seriously overstretched judiciary”).
248. See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG’S TRANSFORMATION INDEX, supra note 5.
249. See id. $$ 10.4.17-.21 (considering the length of time the proceedings were
delayed, balanced against the pace at which proceedings moved through the court
systems as resolutions were appealed).
250. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.4.18 (Nov. 30, 2011).
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due justice and recourse against an insolvent debtor. However, its claim
would be fatally weakened by the Suspensions’ application barring both
domestic and foreign creditors.251 Further, because investors are more
likely to expend available resources to adjudicate their insolvency claim
rather than to seek recourse against the State, it is difficult to say how
often foreign investors will utilize local remedies. Where an investor does
not exhaust local remedies, many of the factors establishing justice denied
are not applicable. Finally, because India, as a massive, developing
country, was exercising practicality in an emergency situation, the
measure is likely justified as an act in the interest of public health.
B. MINISCULE RETROACTIVITY DOES NOT AMOUNT TO LEGAL
UNCERTAINTY
A foreign investor may argue that the reasoning in the Cairn decision
should be followed closely, but the facts in that case can be distinguished
from the situation the Indian courts will soon find themselves in. The
Cairn Tribunal deeply analyzed the retroactive effect of a tax law scheme
in finding the principle of legal certainty, which is fundamental to a state’s
rule of law, was disrupted by the law’s retrospective application.252 These
principles are distinct from the CIRP Suspension situation.
A foreign investor challenging IBC Section 10A may argue that the
Suspension should have technically begun when the Ordinance was
promulgated on June 5, 2020,253 meaning that the Suspension and tax law
both retroactively affect the parties’ rights.254 The argument would then
conclude that, given the factually similar situation, the standards applied
by the Cairn Tribunal when analyzing the tax legislation should also
apply in an assessment of the Ordinance.255 Such a standard would allow
251. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020) (imposing the CIRP Suspension affecting domestic
and foreign creditors alike).
252. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1774-1777 (Dec. 21, 2020).
253. Additionally, the Ordinance’s language provided that the Suspension would
prevent CIRP filings for events of default that occurred during the 12 days prior, as well.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No. XXXI
of 2020, # 10A (issued on June 5, 2020, but effectively barring CIRP filings for events
of default between March 25, 2020, and March 25, 2021).
254. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020).
255. Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $ 1790
(2020).
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the Suspension to stand only if the State, when issuing the rule, was
“facing a situation where the new rule would not fulfil its purpose . . . if
its effects were only prospective.”256
However, the Suspension is distinct from the tax scheme analyzed in
Cairn in more than one way. First, due to the exceptionally brief period
of retroactivity (from June 5, 2020 to March 25, 2020),257 the Ordinance
cannot be likened to the years-long reach of the tax scheme challenged in
Cairn.258 Further, the Ordinance provided at issuance that Section 10A
would only be operative for a limited 6-month period, with the option of
being extended prospectivel! until March 25, 2021.259 It is difficult to
imagine the State, by issuing the Ordinance, intended to pull the rug out
from under any investor or debtor. Rather, the brief period of retroactivity
was a practical and logistical necessity. The State, in an attempt to protect
the maximum number of distressed entities as early as possible, notified
the public of the approaching Suspension only 2 days after the World
Health Organization declared the rising COVID-19 infections a global
pandemic on March 11, 2020.260 However, the Ordinance could not have
been promulgated during that week, because the Indian government,
including the court system, was not fully operational due to strict social
distancing guidelines.261 The logistical concerns contextualizing the
issuance of the Ordinance and the miniscule period of retroactivity,
announced in advance, would allow an ISDS tribunal to easily find the
situation at hand wholly distinct from the years-long reach of the tax
scheme in Cairn.
Even if the law challenged in the Cairn decision is distinguishable,
rendering some proportionality factors irrelevant, the general statement
of the FET standard may still be applicable (though which interpretation

256. Venancio D’Costa & Astha Ojha, IBC Suspended for a Year: What$s in Store for
the Creditors, MONDAQ (Aug. 14, 2020), www.iisd.org/itn/2012/01/12/the- netherlandstreaty-shopping.
257. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
258. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
124 (2020).
259. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020).
260. Domenico Cucinotta & Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a
Pandemic, PUBMED (Mar. 19, 2020), www.pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32191675.
261. See D’Costa & Ojha, supra note 256.
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of FET to apply remains at the discretion of the ISDS tribunal).262 The
requirement of legal certainty, while rooted in the rule of law, “cannot be
understood in absolute terms and should instead be balanced against the
state’s power to act in pursuance of the public purpose.”263 The doctrine’s
non-absolute nature requires “the [state] measures [are] not . . . more
burdensome for the individual’s rights and interests than required by the
pursued public purpose, especially if a less burdensome measure would
be available to satisfy the same public purpose.”264
Applying these principles, the public purposes"to stave off economic
damage, prevent premature liquidation of distressed Indian companies,
and avoid overburdening the judicial system"should balance against the
delays imposed, notwithstanding diminished recoveries among investors
and creditors. At the pandemic’s onset, economic stability required the
continued operation of companies of all sizes because of their
contributions to the economy and ability to provide jobs that empower
individuals with an income and improved standards of living. To protect
as much of the economy as possible, the Suspension halted new CIRP to
prevent companies from closing. Given that the NCLT and NCLAT were
operating remotely and at reduced capacity, no less burdensome measure
was available to deal with the huge volume of insolvency proceedings. 265
Further, from the outset, the Ordinance limited the Suspension’s effect
not to exceed March 25, 2021 in an attempt to minimize corporate sector
harm.266 A tribunal assessing this claim and accounting for the economic
pressures of the pandemic will likely find that the public purpose of the
Suspension justified any resulting judicial delays.267 The measure could
be permissible notwithstanding disturbances in legal certainty.

262. See supra Section II.A (discussing the different interpretations of FET and
inconsistencies between ISDS tribunals’ applications).
263. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $$
1754, 1788 (2020).
264. Id. $ 1788.
265. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42.
266. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (“[N]o application for [CIRP] . . . shall be filed . . . for a period of
six months or such further period, not exceeding one year from such date.”).
267. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42 (“If the
Code was allowed to operate it would have led to the institution of a huge number of
default cases.”).
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Finally, these claims are laid to rest by the logical reality that
investors (foreign and domestic) know or should know about the laws
governing their investments and the legal environment of the host state. 268
In alleging the promise of FET was breached through a disruption in
legal certainty, a foreign investor will likely concede that the IBC
provided some legal certainty before the Suspension.269 In fact, a diligent
investor should be aware of the recourse available upon default and the
likely barriers to insolvency recovery, including that “the time taken to
resolve bankruptcies ranged from 6.5 to 11 years.”270 Thus, by making the
concession that an investor had some certainty and knowledge of the
applicable legal system, the tribunal can conclude a diligent investor also
knew, or should have known, about the judicial delay in the country. 271
Therefore, certainty could not have been disrupted because, before and
after March 2020, foreign investors should have been certain of one thing:
their insolvency claims would not likely be resolved swiftly.
C. ABSENT STATE OFFICIALS’ PROMISES, EXPECTATIONS ARE
ILLEGITIMATE
To successfully show that FET was breached through a disruption in
legitimate expectations, an investor must have held an expectation that
the overseeing tribunal considers legitimate.272 In order for an investor’s
expectation to be considered legitimate, it must allege precise facts
establishing a State officer specifically assured or guaranteed swift
adjudication of CIRP.273 An Indian State Representative’s promise of
speedy proceedings is highly unlikely and might be objectively
unreasonable, given the country’s longstanding conditions of delay, the
268. See Cairn Energy PLC v. Gov’t of India, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, $
1746 (2020).
269. This concession is necessary to support an argument that predictability was
disturbed by the Suspension.
270. See Contractor et al., supra note 23, at 5.
271. See Post Suspension Anal!sis of Stressed Insolvencies, supra note 42.
272. White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $ 10.3.7
(Nov. 30, 2011) (citing ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLU)S PARADELL, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 281-82 (2009)).
Whether an expectation is legitimate will depend on whether and what assurances the
State provided the investor, which is a fact-specific inquiry which will vary by case. At
this point, a situation in which sufficiently unambiguous promises would be made by the
State to an investor are not foreseeable.
273. Id.
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limited capacity of the courts during the pandemic, and the ensuing
backlog.274 Even if assurances were made, the White Industries Tribunal
made clear that “[e]ncouraging remarks from government officials do not
of themselves give rise to legitimate expectations.”275 In the absence of
such assurances, the government’s issuance of the new regulations are not
sufficiently specific to create a legitimate expectation of expediency, and
do not even begin to upset the investor’s expectations.
Even assuming in arguendo that a State Representative assured an
investor of judicial expediency, because the IBC regime is not “targeted
at a specific person or identifiable group,” the investor’s expectations
would still lack an adequate basis to be considered legitimate.276 Thus,
because the conditions of the Indian legal system apply to all Indian
companies, businesses, and citizens, such a claim by an investor who was
promised swift CIRP may still fail.
Likewise, the CIRP Suspension and delayed court conditions apply
evenly to domestic and foreign creditors alike. While some foreign
investors’ ability to propose a scheme of arrangement or CIRP resolution
plan is restricted in a manner distinct from domestic investors, the
Suspension applies equally to both domestic and foreign parties, as
discussed above. Further, the recent ban preventing some foreign
investors from proposing a scheme was not effective during the entire
year-long suspension"the restriction only came into effect during the
Suspension’s last 10 days.277 As such, those investors had 355 da!s during
which they could have alternatively proposed a scheme to repair the
insolvent entity notwithstanding the Suspension. Willful failure to do so
will not be compensated by the State in ISDS arbitration.
Finally, the foreign investor likely knew, or at least should have
known, about the widespread judicial delays in India prior to the effects
of the pandemic, including in the legal regime governing insolvent
companies.278 As such, an investor’s expectations for swift proceedings
would be unreasonable and illegitimate, rendering its claim wholly

See REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 21, 24.
White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $ 10.3.7
(Nov. 30, 2011).
276. See id.
277. See Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., (2019) SCC $ 91
(India) (decided March 15, 2021, 10 days before the year-long CIRP Suspension was
lifted on March 25, 2021).
278. See White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, ad hoc Trib., Final Award, $
10.4.18 (Nov. 30, 2011).
274.
275.
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invalid.279 This is more significant where investments were made prior to
the effect of the IBC in 2016, only 5 years ago, as the previous
cumbersome legal regime allowed more significant, severe delays.
It is difficult to determine if an investor would prevail on such a
claim because the inquiry is assessed on a case-by-case basis and relies
on permissible evidence to establish specific facts. State officials’
assurances must have been very strong, direct, and specific to overcome
the severe deficiencies of a foreign investor’s claim. Because it is highly
unlikely a representative of the State would make such a promise, it is
implausible to think a FET clause was breached by a usurpation of
legitimate expectations.
CONCLUSION
Despite the potential legitimacy of foreign investors’ challenges to
India’s CIRP Suspension, allegations that the Suspension constitutes a
breach of the FET standard will likely fail. Just like a tsunami victim, a
foreign investor may have felt powerless witnessing its potential recovery
through CIRP diminish during the Suspension. However, unlike natural
disaster victims, investors consciously choose to assume certain risks.
Because domestic investors were likewise unable to recover expediently,
and were therefore treated identically to their foreign counterparts, courts
and tribunals will consider the treatment of foreign investors fair. While
the option to propose a scheme of arrangement is no longer available to
some foreign investors, notwithstanding the unavailability of the IBC to
provide such an insolvency resolution, the option to propose a scheme
was available to those investors during the Suspension.
Though the unavailability of new CIRP may have been unfortunate
for countless investors, during which time the IBC maintained its strong
reputation, the extreme nature of the pandemic would reasonably justify
the measure. Because the State imposed the CIRP Suspension “to provide
relief to companies affected by COVID-19 to recover from the financial
stress without facing immediate threat of being pushed to insolvency
proceedings” during a developing public health emergency, an ISDS
tribunal will not likely find the measure arbitrary.280 The Suspension
aimed not only to protect the financial stability of leveraged entities small
Id. $ 10.3.7.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Bill, 2020, Bill No.
XXXI of 2020, # 10A (June 5, 2020), Statement of Objects and Reasons, $ 2.
279.
280.
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and large, but also to decrease capacity required by the court system in
light of mandated social distancing, which forced unfamiliar and
impractical remote operations.281 ISDS tribunals assessing a foreign
investor’s challenge would balance these justifications against the
economic harm to investors, with the State’s interests easily prevailing.
Because the measure applies equally to domestic and foreign investors
and the overburdened nature of India’s court system is not new or unique
to international parties, a foreign investor is not likely to find success
challenging the CIRP Suspension as a breach of the familiar FET clause
within any of India’s applicable BITs.

281.

See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG’S TRANSFORMATION INDEX, supra note 5.

